Prosecuting Judges for Ethical Violations: Are Criminal Sanctions Constitutional and Prudent, or Do They Constitute a Threat to Judicial Independence? by Abramovsky, Abraham & Edelstein, Jonathan I.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 33 | Number 3 Article 1
2006
Prosecuting Judges for Ethical Violations: Are
Criminal Sanctions Constitutional and Prudent, or
Do They Constitute a Threat to Judicial
Independence?
Abraham Abramovsky
Fordham University School of Law
Jonathan I. Edelstein
Attorney in Private Practice
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Judges Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Abraham Abramovsky and Jonathan I. Edelstein, Prosecuting Judges for Ethical Violations: Are Criminal Sanctions Constitutional and
Prudent, or Do They Constitute a Threat to Judicial Independence?, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 727 (2006).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol33/iss3/1
ABRAMOVSKY_CHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011 10:17 PM 
 
101 
PROSECUTING JUDGES FOR ETHICAL 
VIOLATIONS: ARE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRUDENT, OR DO THEY 
CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE? 
 
BY ABRAHAM ABRAMOVSKY*
JONATHAN I. EDELSTEIN
 
**
I. INTRODUCTION. 
 
On March 30, 2006, the New York Court of Appeals made legal history 
by reinstating eight counts of an indictment against former Justice Gerald 
Garson.1  In six of these counts, which had previously been dismissed by 
the Kings County Supreme Court,2 Judge Garson was accused of receiving 
reward for official misconduct under Section 200.25 of the Penal Law, in 
that he allegedly obtained or agreed to obtain a benefit in return for 
violating his duty as a public servant.3  This is hardly an unusual charge to 
be leveled against an allegedly corrupt public official - but in Judge 
Garson’s case, the “duty” he was accused of violating was based purely 
upon the New York State Code of Judicial Ethics.  Specifically, it was 
alleged that Justice Garson acted criminally by conducting improper ex 
parte communications and by accepting fees for referring unrelated cases 
to a private attorney.4
This was only the second time in New York, and the fourth time 
 
 
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  J.S.D., Columbia University, 1976; 
LL.M., Columbia University, 1972, J.D., Buffalo Law School, 1971.  The author 
participated in the defense of People v. Gerald Garson in the Kings County Supreme Court. 
** Attorney in private practice.  J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1997.  The author 
participated in the defense of People v. Gerald Garson in the Kings County Supreme Court. 
1 See People v. Garson, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 616 (Mar. 30, 2006) (“Garson III”). 
2 See People v. Garson, 4 Misc. 3d 258 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 2004) (“Garson I”). 
3 See PL ‘ 200.25. 
4 See notes 36-48 infra and accompanying text. 
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anywhere in the United States,5 that a judge was prosecuted for violating 
ethical strictures that were not explicitly forbidden by a penal statute.  In all 
three previous cases, the appellate courts had held that such attempts were 
improper, characterizing them as violations of the principles of separation 
of powers and judicial independence.6  In the Garson case, however, the 
Kings County District Attorney was ready to try again, claiming that a 
1977 amendment to the New York State Constitution explicitly 
incorporated the ethical rules into the duties of a judge.7
The Kings County Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that 
the considerations of judicial independence, separation of powers and 
constitutional vagueness that informed the previous cases were still valid.
 
8  
This decision was unanimously affirmed by the Second Department of the 
Appellate Division.9  However, the New York Court of Appeals granted 
the District Attorney’s application for leave to appeal,10 and in a 6-1 
decision, concluded that the rules of judicial conduct “set forth a 
constitutionally mandated duty upon the judiciary and, when combined 
with the additional factor of receiving a reward. . . may serve as a basis for 
prosecution under Penal Law ‘ 200.25.”11  The majority found that “to hold 
otherwise. . . would lead to the incongruous result of insulating judges from 
criminal liability under Penal Law ‘ 200.25 because they have a formal 
body of rules governing their conduct while subjecting other public 
servants. . . to criminal liability for similar conduct.”12
In a powerful dissent, however, Judge George Bundy Smith argued that 
the New York code of judicial ethics was never intended to form a basis for 
prosecution and that it was an unconstitutionally vague predicate for 
criminal liability.
 
13  He argued that, even though the courts may have a 
legitimate concern with protecting the integrity of the bench and the 
prosecution may have “amassed a great deal of damning evidence” against 
Justice Garson, “what is at issue is whether or not the Rules of Judicial 
Conduct can be used as a predicate for crimianl prosecution.”14
 
5 See notes 122-218 infra and accompanying text. 
  He 
answered this question in the negative, arguing that erring judges could be 
6 See People v. La Carrubba, 46 N.Y.2d 658, 662-65 (1979); see also State v. Perez, 464 
So. 2d 737, 743-44 (La. 1985); Clayton v. Willis, 489 So.2d 813, 818-20 (Fla. App. 1986). 
7 See notes 58-60 infra and accompanying text. 
8 See Garson I, 4 Misc. 3d at 262-68. 
9 People v. Garson, 17 A.D.3d 695 (2d Dept. 2005) (“Garson II”). 
10 See People v. Garson, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 1903 (June 24, 2005). 
11 Garson III, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 616, at *1. 
12 Id. at *19. 
13 See id. at *45-57 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
14 Id. at *48. 
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adequately punished without criminalizing violations of the ethical code 
and that any incremental gain in deterrence was outweighed by the spector 
of “criminal prosecutor[s] becoming the judge[s] of when and how a rule of 
judicial conduct becomes criminal.”15
Judge Smith’s criticism of the majority opinion was well taken.  Despite 
the majority’s attempt to minimize the impact of its holding,
 
16 the decision 
marks a dramatic shift of power from judges to prosecutors, with local 
prosecutorial agencies having the ability to selectively pursue indictments 
against judges for violation of broadly worded ethical rules.17  Moreover, 
by shifting judicial disciplinary authority toward the District Attorney’s 
office, it may well undermine the separation of powers as well as the role 
of disciplinary boards in regulating the American judiciary.18
Accordingly, this Article will examine the constitutional and practical 
issues surrounding prosecutions of judges for ethical violations.  The first 
part of this Article will focus on the Garson prosecution as an example of 
unwarranted prosecution of judges for violation of ethical codes, and 
discuss the shortcomings of the Court of Appeals’ decision.  The second 
part will examine cases elsewhere in the United States in which judges and 
other public officials have been prosecuted for violations of ethical codes.  
This part will also analyze the manner in which the courts have dealt with 
considerations of constitutional vagueness, judicial independence, 
separation of powers and the potential for vindictive prosecutions.  Finally, 
the third part will discuss the threats to judicial independence that exist 
even under the current American legal framework, as well as the growing 
tendency to blur the lines between civil and criminal liability.  The article 
will conclude that these factors, in combination with the fact that the code 
of judicial ethics was never intended to be a basis for criminal liability, 
militate against the use of such codes to define offenses under New York 
law. 
 
 
15 Id. at *59-61. 
16 See id. at *26-27.  In particular, the majority acknowledged that unlimited criminal 
liability for violations of the Rules of Judicial Conduct was problematic, but opined that 
“criminal prosecution [under PL ‘ 200.25] rests not on a violation of the Rules alone but on 
the acceptance of a benefit for violating an official duty defined by the Rules.”  Id. at *27.  
The majority characterized this as a “critical distinction” that “alleviates. . . the concern that 
to allow criminal prosecution of ethical violations under Penal Law ‘ 195.00(2) would create 
an ‘awkward and often unseemly’ landscape where different groups would likely ‘jockey for 
prosecutorial priority or advantage.’”  As discussed at notes 105-08 infra and accompanying 
text, however, the extraordinarily broad definition of “benefit” under Section 10.00(17) of 
the Penal Law means that this “critical distinction”  in fact has no practical meaning. 
17 See notes 281-84 infra and accompanying text. 
18 See notes 199-218 infra and accompanying text. 
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II. THE GARSON PROSECUTION. 
The investigation of Kings County Supreme Court Justice Gerald 
Garson was a product of an ongoing probe into corruption in the Brooklyn 
courts.  On January 24, 2002, Justice Victor I. Barron was indicted on 
charges of demanding a $115,000 bribe to approve a settlement in favor of 
an infant.19  The indictment, which was the result of a two-year 
investigation, opened a Pandora’s box of charges against other Brooklyn 
judges.  Within two months after the indictment, no fewer than eight judges 
in Kings County were under investigation for activities ranging from 
nepotism, patronage and outright bribe receiving to moonlighting as private 
counsel.20  A 29-member commission headed by Professor John D. Feerick 
of Fordham Law School was empaneled to recommend reforms to enhance 
judicial ethics throughout the state.21  On February 8, Justice Ann T. Pfau, 
a long-time official in the New York Office of Court Administration and a 
key assistant to Chief Administrative Judge Jonathan Lippman, was 
appointed administrative judge in Kings County Supreme Court with a 
mandate to clean up an alleged culture of corruption.22  Her appointment 
led to additional internal probes of judges, private attorneys and Brooklyn 
public officials with ties to the courts.23
It was during this period that Frieda Hanimov, a matrimonial litigant in 
Brooklyn, became dissatisfied with her treatment by Justice Garson.  
Hanimov, whose matrimonial action was pending in front of Judge Garson, 
had lost custody of her children to her husband.  She was then allegedly 
told by her attorney, Paul Siminovsky, that she had lost the case because 
her husband had bribed the judge, and that she could obtain a more 
favorable ruling if she made a better offer.  Siminovsky introduced her to 
Nissim Elmann, a Brooklyn businessman who was allegedly able to 
influence Garson by bribing him. 
 
At that point, Hanimov contacted the Kings County District Attorney 
and became, in her words, an “undercover mom.”24
 
19 See William Glaberson & William K. Rashbaum, Indictment of a Brooklyn Judge 
Provides Details of Seemingly Routine Corruption,  N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 2002, p.B3. 
  In cooperation with 
20 See Joe Maloney, Judge: We’ll Clean Up Courts, Daily News (N.Y.), Feb. 26, 2002, p.18. 
21 See Daniel Wise, Commission Recommends Reforms for Judicial Elections, N.Y.L.J., 
Dec. 4, 2003, p.1. 
22 See Daniel Wise, Pfau Takes Pesce’s Brooklyn Court Post, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 8, 2002, p.1. 
23 See, e.g., In re Feinberg, 2005 N.Y. LEXIS 1464 (2005) (removing Kings County 
Surrogate Michael Feinberg from the bench for giving lucrative guardianships to a close 
associate and permitting him to take excessive legal fees); see also In re Garson, 17 A.D.2d 
243 (1st Dept. 2005) (requiring Justice Michael Garson, a cousin of Gerald Garson, to 
disgorge $163,000 he looted from his aunt’s guardianship estate). 
24 Ms. Hanimov awarded herself this appellation on her web site, 
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the District Attorney’s office, she conducted a number of consensual 
recordings of conversations with Elmann and Siminovsky.  These 
recordings focused the District Attorney’s investigation on an alleged 
conspiracy in which Elmann, Siminovsky, Justice Garson, and his clerk 
Paul Sarnell gave favorable matrimonial rulings in return for bribes. 
As a result of information provided by Hanimov, the District Attorney’s 
office obtained permission to conduct electronic surveillance and video 
recording in Judge Garson’s robing room.25  A number of conversations 
between Garson and Siminovsky were recorded, but none of them yielded 
evidence of bribery.26  Instead, they yielded evidence of certain ethical 
improprieties, including improper ex parte conversations and acceptance of 
referral fees for referring unrelated cases to Siminovsky.27  In addition, the 
monitoring of Justice Garson’s robing room and wiretaps on Siminovsky’s 
and Elmann’s cell phones revealed that Siminovsky frequently treated 
Garson to meals and drinks, although there was no evidence that these 
meals were exchanged for any judicial favors.28
On February 24, 2003, Siminovsky was arrested, following which he 
agreed to cooperate with the prosecution and was debriefed.
 
29  At that time, 
he stated that he had obtained favorable treatment in return for benefits, but 
was unable to provide specific instances.30  He did, though, make 
allegations that would form the basis of later charges against Judge Garson, 
stating that he had provided the judge with meals and drinks in exchange 
for ex parte advice and that he had given the judge fees for referring 
matrimonial clients to him.31  However, Justice Garson did not preside over 
any of the cases he referred to Siminovsky.32  Therefore, the referral fees 
constituted private transactions between attorneys rather than transactions 
made in return for favorable judicial treatment of Siminovsky’s clients.33
 
http://www.friedahanimov.org (last visited July 13, 2005). 
 
25 See Order of Ann T. Pfau dated December 9, 2002, in People v. Gerald Garson, Ind. Nos. 
3515/03 and 5332/03 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.) (on file with author).  This order was 
subsequently renewed on February 3, 2003 and March 7, 2003. 
26 See Affidavit of Deputy Chief Investigator George Terra dated February 3, 2003, in 
People v. Gerald Garson, Ind. Nos. 3515/03 and 5332/03 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.) (“Feb. 3 
Terra Aff.”) (on file with author), && 18-22. 
27 See id. 
28 See id., && 22-24. 
29 See Affidavit of George Terra dated March 7, 2003, in People v. Gerald Garson, Ind. 
Nos. 3515/03 and 5332/03 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.) (“Mar. 7 Terra Aff.”) (on file with author), 
&& 15-16. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
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At the time of his debriefing, Siminovsky also agreed to have his 
conversations recorded.  Pursuant to this agreement, prosecutors recorded 
him engaging in ex parte discussions with the judge.34  In addition, he was 
recorded via video surveillance placing a box of cigars in Justice Garson’s 
desk.35
Shortly thereafter, the Kings County District Attorney’s office obtained 
an indictment charging Justice Garson with several counts of official 
misconduct,
 
36 receiving reward for official misconduct37 and receiving 
unlawful gratuities.38  This indictment was later withdrawn in substantial 
part and superseded by another indictment.39  The top count of the second 
indictment was bribe receiving in the third degree,40 a class D felony 
punishable by up to seven years’ incarceration, predicated upon Justice 
Garson’s receipt of cigars from Siminovsky.41  The precedent-setting 
aspect of the indictment, however, lay in the six counts of receiving reward 
for official misconduct.  Of these, five were predicated upon Judge 
Garson’s alleged receipt of referral fees, and the sixth was grounded upon 
the alleged receipt of benefits for conferring ex parte advice.42
Under New York law, the offense of receiving reward for official 
misconduct is committed when a public servant “solicits, accepts or agrees 
to accept any benefit from another person for having violated his duty as a 
public servant.”
 
43
 
34 See id.  It should be noted that Deputy Chief Investigator Terra described Justice Garson’s 
alleged conduct as unethical rather than criminal in nature, attesting that the recorded 
conversations demonstrated that he was prone “at the very least to violate the judicial and 
attorney code of ethics.”  See Feb. 3 Terra Aff., supra note 26, & 24. 
  As the prosecution acknowledged, there was no statute, 
in the Penal Law, Judiciary Law or elsewhere, defining receipt of private 
referral fees or conferral of ex parte advice as a violation of a judge’s 
35 See Pretrial Omnibus Motion in People v. Gerald Garson, Ind. Nos. 3515/03 and 5332/03 
(Sup. Ct., Kings Co.) (on file with author). 
36 See N.Y. PENAL LAW ‘ 195.00 (McKinney 2005). 
37 See id. ‘ 200.25. 
38 See id. ‘ 200.35. 
39 See Ind. No. 5332/03 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.) (on file with author).  The second indictment 
did not completely supersede the first, in that certain charges from the first indictment 
remained intact.  The two instruments were subsequently consolidated. 
40 See N.Y. PENAL LAW ‘ 200.10. 
41 See Ind. Nos. 3515/03 and 5332/03 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.) (on file with author). 
42 See id. 
43 See N.Y. PENAL LAW ‘ 200.25.  In contrast to the crime of bribe receiving, this offense 
relates to receiving gratuities for having violated one’s public duty in the past, as opposed to 
striking a bargain to violate it in the future.  See William J. Donnino, Practice 
Commentaries to PL ‘ 200.25, 39 McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y. 262 (2000); see also 
People v. Stokner, 152 Misc. 2d 463, 464 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1991); People v. Garson, 4 
Misc. 3d 258, 261 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 2004). 
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duties as a public servant.44  Instead, the prosecution contended that the 
duties of a judge, for purposes of the official misconduct statute, could also 
be defined by the ethical rules promulgated by the Chief Administrator of 
the Courts.45  Specifically, the prosecution contended that the New York 
code of judicial conduct prohibited both the rendering of ex parte advice46 
and the lending of the prestige of judicial office for private purposes,47 and 
that violations of these prohibitions in exchange for a benefit could be 
punished under the Penal Law.48
Justice Garson’s attorneys sought dismissal of these charges through 
several procedural devices.  These included a plenary action for prohibition 
under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules and a pretrial omnibus 
motion in the Kings County Supreme Court.  In making these motions, the 
defense contended that the District Attorney’s use of ethical rules as a 
predicate for charges of receiving reward for judicial misconduct was 
barred by the Court of Appeals’ 1979 decision in People v. La Carrubba.
 
49  
In La Carrubba, Suffolk County Court judge Gioanna La Carrubba was 
charged with official misconduct based on her dismissal of a traffic ticket 
issued to a personal friend.50  As in the Garson case, the prosecution in La 
Carrubba alleged that this action constituted a violation of the code of 
judicial ethics, and therefore of a duty clearly inherent in the nature of the 
defendant’s office.51
Judge La Carrubba was convicted of official misconduct by a Suffolk 
County jury, but a 5-2 majority of the Court of Appeals ruled that her 
conviction must be set aside.  The La Carrubba court began by analyzing 
the history of the official misconduct statute, which was a consolidation of 
more than 30 prior statutes punishing specific acts of misconduct by public 
servants.
 
52  The court noted that it “[did] not appear. . . that any of these 
sections was ever used as the basis for proceedings against a Judge to 
enforce ethical standards or any duty not prescribed by statute.”53
The Court of Appeals then addressed the prosecution’s main contention: 
that the rules of judicial ethics defined a duty so clearly inherent in the 
 
 
44 See Response to Pretrial Omnibus Motion in People v. Gerald Garson, Ind. Nos. 3515/03 
and 5332/03 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.) (on file with author). 
45 See id. 
46 See 22 NYCRR ‘ 100.3(b)(6). 
47 See 22 NYCRR ‘ 100.2(c). 
48 See Response to Omnibus Motion, supra note 44. 
49 46 N.Y.2d 658 (1979). 
50 See id. at 661. 
51 See id. at 663. 
52 See id. at 662. 
53 See id. 
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nature of a judge’s office that violation thereof could be punished as a 
crime.  It rejected that argument in the following terms: 
Our address to this contention begins with noting that “[it] is for the 
legislative branch of a state or the federal government to determine, 
within state or federal  constitutional limits, the kind of conduct which 
shall constitute a crime and the nature and extent of punishment which 
may be imposed therefor.” Even by explicit provision the Legislature may 
not delegate the essentially legislative function of definition of a 
substantive criminal offense.  In the present instance, however, there has 
not even been an attempted delegation by the Legislature, for it has 
neither incorporated nor otherwise adopted the provisions of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct.  Here the attempt is by the District Attorney alone, 
unaided by any legislative enactment, to import a definition of judicial 
duty based on ethical standards. . .  While there can be no doubt of the 
authority of bar associations to promulgate enforceable ethical standards 
or of the Appellate Division to incorporate such standards in rules of 
court, neither the bar associations nor the Appellate Division is 
empowered to discharge the legislative responsibility to define the 
elements of a crime.54
The court noted further that ethical rules and penal statutes serve 
different purposes, and that the promulgation of ethical rules did not give 
fair notice to judges that violation might be subject to criminal penalties.
 
55  
In addition, the court noted the special role of the Commission on Judicial 
Conduct in disciplining judges, and found that it would be both unseemly 
and damaging to judicial independence to have prosecutors “jockeying” 
with the commission for a role in judicial discipline.56  Therefore, the La 
Carrubba court concluded that unless judicial conduct was explicitly 
prohibited by statute, it could not be used as the basis for a charge of 
official misconduct under the Penal Law.57
The prosecution in Garson responded to the defendant’s reliance on La 
Carrubba by arguing that it was no longer good law.  Specifically, the 
prosecution relied upon a 1977 amendment to Article VI, Section 20 of the 
New York Constitution, which provided that judges shall “be subject to 
such rules of conduct as may be promulgated by the chief administrator of 
the courts with the approval of the court of appeals.”
 
58
 
54 Id. at 663. 
  The prosecution 
argued that, by promulgating this amendment, the New York Legislature 
explicitly incorporated the rules of judicial ethics into the duties of a judge, 
55 Id. at 663-64. 
56 Id. at 665. 
57 See id. at 664-65. 
58 See N.Y. Const. art. VI, ‘ 20(4). 
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and violation of those rules after 1977 constituted a violation of a judge’s 
duties as a public servant.59  In addition, the prosecution argued that Justice 
Garson’s case was distinguishable from La Carrubba because he was 
charged with receiving a benefit in return for his misdeeds.60
The defense countered by arguing that the 1986 constitutional 
amendment did not supersede La Carrubba.  It noted both the Chief 
Administrator’s statement that the judicial rules should not be used as a 
basis for criminal liability
 
61 and the Court of Appeals’ statement that the 
legislature may not delegate the function of defining an offense “even by 
explicit provision.”62  Thus, the defendant contended that even an 
amendment to the state constitution providing that judges must be “subject 
to” the rules of judicial conduct could not operate as a delegation of the 
power to define a criminal offense.63  Furthermore, the defense contended 
that because the rules of judicial ethics included broadly worded 
aspirational standards such as the requirement that judges act courteously 
and avoid even the appearance of impropriety, it could open the door to 
limitless prosecution.64
Finally, the defendant contended that Justice Garson’s alleged receipt of 
a benefit did not constitute grounds for distinguishing his case from La 
Carrubba.
 
65  Specifically, he noted that even though La Carrubba was 
charged under section 195.00(2) of the Penal Law rather than section 
195.00(1), this prong of the statute also required that the defendant obtain 
or seek a benefit on behalf of herself or a third person.66  Moreover, he 
argued that the issue of receiving benefits was explicitly discussed by the 
La Carrubba court and found to be an insufficient reason to warrant the 
incorporation of ethical rules into the official misconduct statute.67  
Therefore, the defense contended that the judge’s alleged receipt of a 
benefit did not constitute a valid basis to reject the holding of the La 
Carrubba court.68
On April 29, 2004, Justice Steven Fisher of the Kings County Supreme 
Court issued a decision dismissing the charges of receiving reward for 
 
 
59 See Response to Omnibus Motion, supra note 44. 
60 See id. 
61 See Preamble to Title 22, Chapter 100 of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations. 
62 See La Carrubba, 46 N.Y.2d at 663. 
63 See Reply to Pretrial Omnibus Motion in People v. Gerald Garson, Ind. Nos. 3515/03 and 
5332/03 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co.) (on file with author). 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 See id., citing La Carrubba, 46 N.Y.2d at 665. 
68 See id. 
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official misconduct.69  The court rejected the prosecution’s argument that 
the 1977 constitutional amendment amounted to a legislative overruling of 
La Carrubba, holding that, even if the amendment conferred the power to 
define elements of crimes upon the Chief Administrator of the Courts, that 
“authority. . . has not been effectively exercised.”70  The court noted that, in 
the preamble to the very rules that the prosecution sought to enforce as 
elements of official misconduct, the Chief Administrator explicitly stated 
that they were not designed as a basis for criminal prosecution.71  This 
made it “evident. . . [that] the Rules. . . are intended to provide a structure 
for regulating judicial conduct through the Commission [on Judicial 
Conduct], and not through criminal prosecution.”72
In addition, Judge Fisher noted that the Code of Judicial Conduct was 
“in large measure, a compilation of ethical standards, goals and aspirations 
that are stated in broad and general terms.”
 
73  These included, inter alia, 
requirements that judges act patiently and courteously with litigants, 
promote public confidence in the judiciary and require high ethical 
standards of their staff.74  The court concluded that “[t]he notion that Rules 
like these can define an element of a crime is untenable,” in that they were 
too broadly worded to give fair notice of the conduct that was prohibited.75
Justice Fisher then examined the specific rules underlying the charges of 
receiving reward for official misconduct and concluded that they were 
precisely the type of generalized regulation that should not give rise to 
criminal liability.
 
76  He noted, for instance, that the rule against improper 
ex parte communications “list[ed] five separate and broadly worded 
exceptions,” and that due to its vagueness, it would be “problematic when 
employed to define an element of a crime.”77
The rule against “lend[ing] the prestige of judicial office to advance the 
 
 
69 People v. Garson, 4 Misc. 3d 258 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 2004). 
70 See id. at 263. 
71 See id. at 265, citing Preamble to Title 22, Section 100 of the New York Code of Rules 
and Regulations. 
72 Id. at 266. 
73 Id. at 263. 
74 See id. at 263-64, citing 22 NYCRR ‘‘ 100.1, 100.2(a), 100.3(b)(3). 
75 Id. at 264. 
76 See id. at 264-65. 
77 See id. at 265.  As an example of the potential overbreadth of the rule, Justice Fisher cited 
the disciplinary case of Matter of Levine, 74 N.Y.2d 294 (1989), in which a judge was 
disciplined for “having communications with a non-party former political leader about an 
adjournment in a pending case.”  See Garson, 4 Misc. 3d at 265 (citing Levine).  Given that 
many judges in New York are elected officials, it is apparent that criminalizing their ex 
parte communications with political figures might be seized upon as a convenient tactic by 
rival candidates for judicial office or prosecutors from the opposing political party. 
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private interests of the judge or others” was also found by Judge Fisher to 
be too general to constitute a basis for criminal conduct.78  The court noted, 
inter alia, that judges had been disciplined under this rule for “interced[ing] 
in. . . criminal cases for the purpose of seeking lenient treatment for the 
defendants,”79 and that the Court of Appeals had extended it in some 
circumstances to unintentional conduct.80  In sum, it determined that La 
Carrubba was still good law.81
Nor did the court accept the prosecution’s contention that Justice Garson 
was “being prosecuted, not merely for violating a Rule, but for accepting a 
benefit for having done so.”
 
82  It noted that “the Court of Appeals brushed 
aside a similar argument in La Carrubba,” on the ground that most 
unethical conduct could be regarded as an attempt to obtain some sort of 
personal benefit.83  Moreover, the court found that acceptance of a benefit 
is only one element of the offense with which Justice Garson was charged, 
and that such acceptance could not constitute criminal conduct unless the 
prosecution could separately prove that he violated his duties as a public 
servant.84
In sum, Justice Fisher found that “the District Attorney has pointed to no 
instance in which a Judge in this State has been successfully prosecuted for 
a crime of which an essential element was the violation of a Rule of the 
Chief Administrator of the Courts,” and that sanctions against judges for 
violating such rules had hitherto been applied only in disciplinary 
proceedings.
 
85  Therefore, the court held that the evidence before the grand 
jury was not legally sufficient to support the charges of receiving reward 
for official misconduct.86
The prosecution filed a notice of appeal from the trial court decision, and 
on March 18, 2005, the case was argued before the Second Department of 
the Appellate Division.
 
87
 
78 See Garson I, 4 Misc. 3d at 265. 
  At oral argument, the prosecution contended that 
79 Id., citing Matter of Kiley, 74 N.Y.2d 364 (1989). 
80 Id., citing Matter of Sims, 61 N.Y.2d 349, 358 (1984). 
81 Id. at 265-66. 
82 Id. at 266. 
83 Id., citing People v. La Carrubba, 46 N.Y.2d 658, 665 (1979). 
84 See id. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. at 267.  The court upheld one count of official misconduct on the theory that Judge 
Garson had violated a statutory duty, imposed by Section 18 of the Judiciary Law, by 
accepting cigars in return for giving ex parte advice to Siminovsky.  See id. at 267-69.  It 
dismissed two other counts of official misconduct as duplicative, but let stand one count of 
receiving unlawful gratuities and one count of bribe receiving in the third degree.  See id. at 
260-61, 267-70. 
87 See Daniel Wise, NY Prosecutors Argue to Restore Felony Counts Against Judge, 
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Justice Fisher’s interpretation of the law would undermine the ability of the 
state government to attack corruption in the courts.88  The Kings County 
District Attorney’s representatives also argued that the trial court’s 
interpretation would lead to discrepancies in which people who offered 
rewards to judges could be prosecuted while the judges who received the 
gratuities could not.89  The defense countered that Justice Fisher’s 
interpretation, which was consistent with La Carrubba, was necessary to 
preserve judicial independence and prevent prosecutorial overreaching.90
On April 25, 2005, the Second Department affirmed the Kings County 
Supreme Court’s decision in a brief memorandum.
 
91  Citing La Carrubba, 
the court held that “[a]n indictment in which the defendant’s duty as a 
public servant, an essential element of the crime of receiving reward for 
official misconduct, is defined solely by reference to the Rules of Judicial 
Conduct. . . is insufficient.”92  Subsequently, however, the New York Court 
of Appeals granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal and, on 
March 30, 2006, issued a decision reversing the holdings below and 
reinstating the charges of receiving reward for official misconduct.93
The six-judge majority began its analysis by noting that, in enacting 
Section 200.25 of the Penal Law, “the Legislature. . . left for factual 
resolution whether a public servant has ‘violated his duty,’” and that proof 
of a public servant’s duties could be adduced in the form of expert 
testimony or violation of a code of rules.
 
94  Therefore, it reasoned that 
exclusion of the Rules of Judicial Conduct from the scope of judicial duties 
would “create a new void B the immunization of judges from criminal 
prosecution when they receive an illicit benefit after violating a Rule 
Governing Judicial Conduct.”95  Since such a holding would “run[] counter 
to the legislative objective of deterring public servants from, and 
prosecuting them for, abusing their positions,”96
 
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 21, 2005, p.1. 
 the majority “conclude[d] 
that the People may rely on the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct to prove 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 See People v. Garson, 17 A.D.3d 695 (2d Dept. 2005). 
92 Id. (citations omitted). 
93 People v. Garson, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 616 (Mar. 30, 2006). 
94 Id. at *14-15. 
95 See id. at *16; see also id. at *19 (stating that a contrary holding “would lead to the 
incongruous result of insulating judges from criminal liability under Penal Law ‘ 200.25 
because they have a formal body of rules governing their conduct while subjecting other 
public servants - whose duties are not defined in either Penal Law ‘ 200.25 or any express 
code of conduct comparable to the Rules B to criminal liability for similar conduct”). 
96 See id. at *19-20. 
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the element of a judge’s ‘duty as a public servant’ within the meaning of 
Penal Law ‘ 200.25.”97
The majority then went on to find, contrary to the Supreme Court and 
the Appellate Division, that La Carrubba was not controlling as to the facts 
at bar.
 
98  First, the majority ruled that the Code of Judicial Conduct at issue 
in La Carrubba was “merely a compliation of ethical objectives and 
exhortations,” whereas the subsequently enacted Rules were “a 
fundamental objective standard of how judges must conduct themselves.”99  
The “objective” nature of the Rules, combined with the 1977 constitutional 
amendment making compliance mandatory, provided sufficient notice that 
they were part of New York judges’ duties and “addresses the concern that 
the prosecutor could use an advisory, aspirational code of ethics to help 
prove an element of the crime.”100  Moreover, the statement in the 
preamble to the effect that the Rules “are not designed or intended as a 
basis for. . . criminal prosecution” was “not controlling of a statute or rule’s 
terms but. . . simply a useful aid for interpreting them where there is 
ambiguity.”101
The majority also found a second “key difference” between the Garson 
prosecution and La Carrubba.  Specifically, the majority opined that in La 
Carrubba, “the Penal Law was effectively being used as a vehicle to pursue 
claims of ethical improprieties” against a judge who violated her “duties to 
avoid the appearance of impropriety and to act impartially.”
 
102  In contrast, 
“the criminal prosecution [in Garson] rests not on a violation of the Rules 
alone but on the acceptance of a benefit for violating an official duty 
defined by the Rules.”103
Had the judge as a public servant violated ethical duties alone B without 
accepting a benefit for the violation B and had the action not otherwise 
been prohibited by the Penal Law, the public servant would be subject 
only to discipline in a proceeding brought by the Commission on Judicial 
Conduct.  This critical distinction alleviates many of the concerns we had 
in La Carrubba, including the concern that to allow criminal prosecution 
of ethical violations under Penal Law ‘ 195.00(2) would create an 
“awkward and often unseemly” landscape where different groups would 
  The majority further explained its reasoning as 
follows: 
 
97 Id. at *21. 
98 See id. at *21-28. 
99 Id. at *22, *25. 
100 See id. at *25-26. 
101 See id. at *25, citing McKinney’s Statutes ‘ 122. 
102 See id. at *26-27. 
103 Id. at *27. 
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likely “jockey for prosecutorial priority or advantage.”104
The majority’s attempt to distinguish La Carrubba, however, fails in at 
least five respects to withstand scrutiny.  First, the requirement that a public 
servant accept or agree to accept a “benefit” in order to be prosecuted under 
PL ‘ 200.25, which the majority described as a “critical distinction,” is in 
fact no distinction at all.  Pursuant to Section 10.00(17) of the Penal Law, a 
“benefit” means “any gain or advantage to the beneficiary and includes any 
gain or advantage to a third person pursuant to the desire or consent of the 
beneficiary.”
 
105
This being so, it is difficult to imagine how the facts of Garson could be 
distinguished on this basis from those of La Carrubba.  To be sure, Judge 
La Carrubba did not intend to realize any personal gain from her unethical 
conduct, but she did intend that her friend obtain a “gain or advantage” - 
namely, the dismissal of a traffic summons.
  Therefore, a judge need not realize any personal gain in 
order to accept a “benefit;” instead, all that is necessary is that he acquiesce 
in a gain or advantage being realized by a third party. 
106  Therefore, Judge La 
Carrubba intended to obtain a “benefit” within the definition of the Penal 
Law - and, as the La Carrubba court noted, most unethical conduct can be 
so categorized because it is intended to benefit someone.107  Indeed, La 
Carrubba cannot even be distinguished from Garson in terms of the 
elements of the underlying statute, because the offense with which Judge 
La Carrubba was charged similarly requires  proof that the defendant acted 
with “intent to obtain a benefit or deprive another person of a benefit.”108
Second, while some of the Rules of Judicial Conduct might be more 
specific or “objective” than the code at issue in La Carrubba, they still 
contain numerous broadly worded “ethical objectives and exhortations.”
 
109  
As pointed out by the Supreme Court, the Rules of Judicial Conduct require 
inter alia that judges “act at all times in a manner that promotes public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”110 and that they 
be “patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers 
and others.”111
 
104 Id. at *27-28. 
  Such admonitions are hardly “objective” standards of 
conduct - and, although the majority paid lip service to the problematic 
105 PL ‘ 10.00(17). 
106 See La Carrubba, 46 N.Y.2d at 661. 
107 See id. at 665. 
108 See PL ‘ 195.00. 
109 See Garson III, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 616, *22. 
110 22 NYCRR ‘ 100.2(1). 
111 22 NYCRR ‘ 100.3(3). 
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effect of prosecuting judges for such “ethical improprieties,”112 it provided 
no meaningful basis to distinguish between them and the more specific 
prohibitions contained in the Rules.  As Judge George Bundy Smith wrote 
in his powerful dissent, the majority opinion effectively renders 
“prosecutor[s]. . . the judge[s] of when and how rule[s] of judicial conduct 
become[] criminal.”113
Judge Smith’s dissent also highlights yet a third basis on which the 
majority opinion falls short: specifically, the issue of notice.  As the 
dissenting judge argued: 
 
There is nothing in the preamble [of the Rules on Judicial Conduct] to 
suggest that criminal prosecution can result from any violation of the 
Rules.  Further, the premable explicitly states that the criminal 
prosecution should not result from the Rules.  Consequently, defendant 
was not on notice that the rules of conduct could result in criminal 
prosecution.114
Moreover, Judge Smith noted that “[t]here appear to be no statutes and 
no cases that hold that a judge can be held criminally liable for failure to 
comply with the Rules of Judicial Conduct.”
 
115  Thus, even assuming 
arguendo that the preamble was not binding on the courts, its existence 
precluded a finding that judges were on notice of the possibility that ethical 
lapses might result in prosecution.116
Fourth, the dissenting judge noted that Article III, section 1 of the New 
York State Constitution vests the legislative power in the Senate and 
Assembly, and that “[t]he legislative power cannot be passed on to 
others.”
 
117  As such, the Legislature had no power to delegate to the 
Commission on Judicial Conduct the authority to define criminal offenses, 
and “[t]he clearest reading of 22 NYCRR Part 100 is that it consists of 
rules governing judicial conduct, not criminal statutes passed by the 
Legislature.”118
Finally, the dissent argued that “[i]t is simply incorrect that judges are 
immune from the criminal law if hte Rules of Judicial Conduct do not 
authorize a criminal action,” and cited other statutes under which erring 
 
 
112 See Garson III, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 616, *27. 
113 Id. at *59 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
114 Id. at *41-42. 
115 Id. at *48. 
116 See id. at *54-59.  Moreover, Judge Smith argued that the preamble is “the key which 
opens the mind of the lawmakers as to the mischiefs which are indended to be remedied by 
the statute. . .  [it] is entitled to great respect though it is not conclusive.”  See id. at *58, 
citing McKinney’s Statutes ‘ 122. 
117 See id. at *40, quoting Darweger v. Staats, 267 N.Y. 290, 305 (1935). 
118 Id. at *41. 
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judges can be, and are, prosecuted.119  Judge Smith contended that 
incremental gain in deterrence is outweighed by the new uncertainty as to 
which ethical violations might subject judges to criminal sanction, the 
empowerment of prosecutors to selectively file charges against sitting 
judges, and the diminution of the Commission on Judicial Conduct’s role in 
judicial discipline.120
III. AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING ETHICAL VIOLATIONS 
BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS. 
  The impact of these factors upon judicial 
independence will be discussed further in subsequent parts of this Article. 
The issues raised in Garson are relatively novel to American 
jurisprudence, because there have been few attempts to prosecute public 
officials based solely on ethical violations.  This is particularly true of 
attorneys and judges, who are traditionally subject to internal discipline and 
whose prosecution implicates separation of powers concerns.121  For the 
most part, even serious ethical lapses by such officials have been punished 
administratively rather than through criminal prosecution, unless their acts 
fall within the ambit of a specific criminal statute.122  In an extreme case, a 
Nebraska county judge who practiced in his own court was disciplined 
administratively because he was not shown to have taken bribes or 
otherwise acted corruptly.123
Beginning about 1960, however, several factors combined to create a 
public perception of a need for greater judicial discipline.
 
124  Prior to this 
time, it was widely believed that judicial rulings were guided by common-
law precedent and the “broadly shared values” of society.125
 
119 Id. at *61. 
  This belief 
began to erode during the upheavals of the civil rights era, as judges 
increasingly challenged both the precedent of prior courts and the 
120 See id. at *59-61. 
121 See notes 188-218 infra and accompanying text. 
122 Needless to say, conduct that is violative of a specific criminal statute can be a basis for 
criminal prosecution even if it also constitutes a violation of an ethical rule.  See, e.g., 
People v. Lynch, 176 Misc. 2d 430, 437 (Sup. Ct., Rockland Co. 1998) (“[e]thical 
impropriety may coexist with criminal conduct and the existence of the former does not 
preempt the imposition of criminal sanction for the violation of a penal statute”); see also 
William E. Nelson, The Integrity of the Judiciary in Twentieth Century New York, 51 
Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (1998) (noting that “[n]o one has ever doubted that a judge who is caught 
accepting bribes to determine the outcome of cases should be thrown from the bench and 
sent to prison”). 
123 See Nebraska State Bar Ass’n v. Wiebusch, 45 N.W.2d 583 (Neb. 1951). 
124 See Nelson, supra note 95, at 34. 
125 See id. 
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consensus of society.126  As the public became increasingly aware that 
judges had no ironclad rules to guide their decisions, it began to seek 
outside controls as a restraint on judicial power.127
These factors, in other words, “made it necessary to ‘erect something 
new with which to convince the public, and perhaps even the judges 
themselves, of the special dignity and integrity of the bench.’”
 
128  In order 
to maintain full confidence in the often subjective nature of the judicial 
decision-making process, “[j]udges. . . had to abide by standards of conduct 
on a plane much higher than those for society as a whole’ in order to 
preserve ‘the integrity and independence of the judiciary.’”129  Judicial 
ethics, “in short, had to be made pure.”130
One effect of such higher standards was the creation of formal judicial 
disciplinary commissions, such as the 1975 establishment of the New York 
Commission on Judicial Conduct.
 
131  Furthermore, in a number of cases, 
prosecutors sought to enforce these standards with the threat of criminal 
liability.132
A. Delegation of Legislative Authority. 
  In most cases where prosecutors have sought to enforce ethical 
codes through criminal sanction, they have utilized penal statutes 
prohibiting official misconduct, contending that such ethical codes are part 
of public officials’ duties.  All but three of these cases have resulted in 
decisions in the defendants’ favor, and the analysis of the courts has 
focused on three issues: separation of powers, the extent of legislative 
authority that can be delegated to administrative agencies, and the 
possibility of frivolous prosecutions. 
The decision most analogous to Garson, albeit not involving a judge, 
may be the Minnesota case of State v. Serstock.133
 
126 See id. 
 The defendant in 
Serstock, a deputy Minneapolis city attorney, was accused of “ticket 
127 See id. 
128 Id. at 34-35. 
129 Id. at 35. 
130 Id. 
131 See Gerald Stern, Judicial Error that is Subject to Discipline in New York, 32 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 1547, 1548-49 (2004).  Prior to the establishment of the Commission, judicial 
discipline was conducted on an ad hoc basis by the appellate courts.  See id.  It should be 
noted that Stern himself was the first chairman of the Commission, and was so influential 
concerning judicial discipline in New York that the tribunal was known colloquially as the 
“Stern Commission.” 
132 See notes 133-218 infra and accompanying text. 
133 390 N.W.2d 399 (Minn. App. 1986) (“Serstock I”), rev’d in part, 402 N.W.2d 514 
(Minn. 1987) (“Serstock II”). 
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fixing,” but his activities didn’t involve the quid pro quo of dismissal for 
money normally associated with fixing tickets.134  Instead, he “dismissed or 
wrongfully delayed numerous parking tickets and moving violations as a 
personal favor” for two local people to whom he was financially 
indebted,135 and also improperly dismissed tickets charging offenses that 
occurred outside Minneapolis.136
In the absence of any evidence of bribery, the prosecution charged 
Serstock with misconduct as a public officer under Minnesota law.
  There was no indication that he received 
forbearance of his debts or any other financial consideration in return for 
these dismissals. 
137  This 
statute prohibits a public officer, while acting in his official capacity, from 
performing “an act which he knows is in excess of his lawful authority or 
which he knows he is forbidden by law to do in his official capacity.”138  
The prosecution’s theory was that “Serstock knew [his] actions were in 
excess of his lawful authority. . . because they were flagrant violations of 
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Ethics Code of the 
Minneapolis City Attorney.”139  As in Garson, the prosecutor argued that 
these ethical codes “may be used to define the ‘lawful authority’ which 
may not be ‘exceeded’ by a public officer,” and that “a violation of either 
of these codes of conduct by a Minneapolis city attorney is ipso facto a 
violation of [the official misconduct statute.”140
The Minnesota Court of Appeal disagreed.  Although it suggested that a 
“properly promulgated rule or regulation of an administrative agency” may 
have the force of law and define a legal duty,
 
141 it noted that the ethical 
code promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court was prefaced by an 
order providing that violations “shall be subject to discipline or disbarment 
in the manner provided by rules of this court.”142
 
134 Serstock I, 390 N.W.2d at 401. 
  Thus, the court 
concluded that “[v]iolations of the code were therefore intended to subject 
an attorney to disciplinary proceedings, not criminal charges,” and that 
there was no indication that the legislature intended ethical violations 
without more “to form the basis of a criminal charge of official misconduct 
135 See id. at 401 & n.1. 
136 See id. 
137 See Minn. Stat. ‘ 609.43(2). 
138 See id. 
139 Serstock I, 390 N.W.2d at 401. 
140 Id. at 402 (emphasis in original). 
141 Id. at 404, citing People v. Samel, 451 N.E.2d 892, 896 (Ill. App. 1983) (“an agency 
exercising its rule-making power gives expression to legislative policy and thus performs a 
quasi-legislative function”). 
142 Id. at 403, quoting Minn. Supreme Court Order (Aug. 4, 1970). 
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against a public attorney.”143
The court further held that the ethics code of the Minneapolis City 
Attorney’s office “is not the product of any type of legislative function 
[but] is simply the conditions of employment which are required of 
employees by their employer.”
 
144
An examination of the conduct which would become criminal under the 
State’s theory demonstrates the impossibility of its position. The Ethics 
Code of the Minneapolis City Attorney prohibits city attorneys from 
giving “rude” or “discriminatory treatment” to any person; they may not 
“lose impartiality” or “impede government efficiency.”  Attorney 
employees cannot engage in any other employment without giving notice, 
nor “accept any gift.”  They cannot engage in any “infamous, immoral or 
notoriously disgraceful conduct,” make public comment on any matter of 
“office policy” or lobby for or against any proposed legislation.  We do 
not think the legislature intended such actions by public attorneys to be 
crimes under section 609.43(2).  In addition, we are unwilling, in this 
instance, to rely upon prosecutorial discretion as the sole safeguard 
between public attorneys and a multitude of dubious criminal charges.
  Moreover, permitting criminal 
prosecution solely for violation of the ethical code might give rise to 
irresponsible charges: 
145
Therefore, “an allegation that a public attorney simply violated an “ethics 
code” promulgated by his employer does not state a criminal offense” 
under the Minnesota official misconduct statute.
 
146
The Court of Appeals did find, however, that Serstock could be 
prosecuted for exceeding his geographic jurisdiction, which was 
established by statute rather than disciplinary rule.
 
147  The matter was then 
taken to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which extended the Court of 
Appeals’ holding by dismissing the indictment outright.148
 
143 Id. 
  The en banc 
court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that neither the Code of 
Professional Responsibility nor the Minneapolis ethics code were intended 
144 See id. at 404. 
145 Id. at 404.  Many commentators have noted the dangers of using essentially regulatory 
codes to enforce criminal liability.  See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean 
“Criminal?”  Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 
B.U. L. Rev. 193, 200 (1991) (noting that “the criminal sanction is increasingly used by 
regulators as a preferred enforcement tool without regard to the traditional limitations on its 
use”).  Coffee argues that, “once everything wrongful is determined to be criminal, society’s 
ability to reserve special condemnation for some forms of misconduct is either lost or 
simply reduced to a matter of prosecutorial discretion.”  Id. at 201. 
146 See Serstock I, 390 N.E.2d at 404. 
147 See id. at 404-05. 
148 See Serstock II, 402 N.E.2d at 515. 
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to form the basis of criminal prosecution.149  It also voiced concern that, by 
requiring proof of an ethical violation as part of the prosecutor’s burden, 
such prosecutions would require lower courts to determine whether ethical 
violations occurred and compromise the Supreme Court’s role as the sole 
arbiter of attorney discipline.150
The Serstock decision therefore involved circumstances remarkably 
parallel to those of Garson - i.e., an ethical code that was promulgated 
under statutory authority but specifically stated that it was not intended as a 
basis for criminal prosecution.  As the prosecutor in Garson noted, this set 
up a potential paradox.  On the one hand, such an ethical code is 
promulgated by an agency that has been given the statutory power to define 
an attorney’s duty, and a violation of the code by a public attorney would 
arguably be tantamount to a violation of his public trust.  On the other 
hand, the authors of the code specifically stated that they did not intend it to 
define public officers’ duties for purposes of criminal liability.  The 
Serstock court resolved this dilemma by treating the delegation of 
legislative power as total: i.e., that the code in its entirety was an 
expression of legislative policy, including the limitations on its use for 
prosecutorial purposes. 
 
This resolution could provide a blueprint, not only for Minnesota and 
New York, but for the 25 other states whose codes of judicial ethics are 
modeled after the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.  The 
preamble to that code, which has been adopted verbatim in 27 states, 
provides that it is “designed to provide guidance to judges. . . and to 
provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies,” 
but “is not designed or intended as a basis for civil liability or criminal 
prosecution.”151
A closer question is presented in the 22 states where the code of judicial 
ethics is silent as to whether it is intended to be enforced by criminal 
  By the reasoning of Serstock, the adoption of this 
language by a court or administrative body that is legislatively empowered 
to regulate judicial conduct is tantamount to its adoption by the legislature 
itself.  Accordingly, adoption of the 1990 Model Code arguably represents 
a legislative decision to remove ordinary ethical violations from the ambit 
of the criminal law. 
 
149 See id. at 516-17.  The court noted that, even assuming arguendo that the intent of the 
ethical provisions was ambiguous, the rule of lenity dictated that this ambiguity be resolved 
in the defendant’s favor.  See id. at 516, citing State v. Haas, 159 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Minn. 
1968). 
150 Id. at 517 n.2.  The Supreme Court additionally dismissed the count charging Serstock 
with exceeding his geographic jurisdiction, but did so on the technical ground that the 
indictment was insufficiently specific as to the statutory duty he violated.  See id. at 518. 
151 See ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble-Terminology (1990). 
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sanction.152  This question was answered in the negative by the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana in State v. Perez,153 in which a district attorney and 
judge were prosecuted for colluding in the unlawful discharge of a grand 
jury.154  The Plaquemines Parish district attorney, Leander Perez, was 
accused of official misconduct in connection with a grand jury that was 
investigating corruption in the parish.155  After the grand jury foreman 
received a letter suggesting that members of the district attorney’s family 
be indicted for illegal real estate transactions, Perez met with the 
supervising judge, Eugene E. Leon, Jr., and agreed that the grand jurors be 
discharged.156  Subsequently, Perez empaneled another grand jury and 
secured indictments of the letter’s author and the former grand jury’s 
foreman.157
When the truth came out and Perez and Leon were themselves indicted, 
they moved for a writ of prohibition enjoining their prosecution, which the 
Louisiana Court of Appeal granted.
 
158  On appeal, the Supreme Court 
reinstated some of the charges, which accused Perez and Leon of violating 
certain duties imposed upon them by statute.159  However, the court 
rejected the prosecution’s argument that Disciplinary Rule 7-103 of the 
Louisiana Code of Professional Responsibility “imposed an affirmative 
duty upon the district attorney not to institute the extortion charges against 
[the foreman and letter-writer] in bad faith and without probable cause.”160  
Instead, it held that in light of the traditional discretion afforded to district 
attorney’s in bringing criminal charges, a charge of malfeasance could not 
be based on an ethical rule alone without “a specific provision of law.”161
 
152 The majority of these states have adopted codes of judicial ethics predicated on the 1972 
ABA Model Code, which did not contain a preamble.  Montana is currently the only state 
that has not adopted a code of ethics based on the 1972 or 1990 model codes.  See Cynthia 
Gray, The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing Independence and 
Accountability, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 1245, 1246 n.4 (2004).  Montana’s ethical rules are still 
based largely on the ABA’s 1924 Model Canons of Judicial Ethics. 
  
153 464 So. 2d 737 (La. 1985) (“Perez II”). 
154 See id. at 739. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. at 739 & n.1.  The letter “charged the [Perez] family. . . with illegally obtaining 
oil properties of the Parish,” and “observed that civil litigation [to recover the properties] 
would be lengthy and suggested that if the grand jury were to bring indictments against the 
Perezs, the family might be persuaded to return some of the oil properties.”  Id. at 739. 
157 See id.  The facts of the case, which set forth a classic tale of parish corruption, are set 
out at greater length in the Court of Appeal decision reviewed by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court.  See State v. Perez, 450 So. 2d 1324, 1327-35 (La. App. 1984) (“Perez I”). 
158 See Perez I, 450 So. 2d at 1338-39. 
159 Perez II, 464 So. 2d at 741-43, 744. 
160 See id. at 741. 
161 Id. at 744.  The majority also rejected a concurring argument that, since the Louisiana 
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The Florida courts have similarly held, although the state judicial code of 
ethics is silent as to the imposition of criminal liability, that ethical 
violations alone cannot form the basis for prosecuting a county judge.162
In Iowa, the code of judicial conduct is unique in providng that ethical 
violations can subject judges “to the imposition of criminal and civil 
penalties in the manner provided by law.”
 
163  There is no reported decision, 
however, in which an Iowa judge has ever been prosecuted solely for a 
violation of the code of ethics.  And even if such a prosecution were 
instituted, it wouldn’t necessarily pass muster in the courts.  In Delaware, 
for instance, a court dismissed charges of official misconduct against a 
state banking commissioner that were predicated solely upon his violation 
of administrative conflict-of-interest rules, even though the legislature had 
provided that “[s]ome standards of this type are so vital to government that 
violation thereof should subject the violator to criminal penalties.”164  The 
court concluded that, absent a legislative determination as to which ethical 
lapses might warrant criminal sanction, the conflict-of-interest rule could 
not be considered a “duty. . . [so] clearly inherent in the nature of [the 
defendant’s] office” as to be a basis for an official misconduct charge.165
The courts of Illinois have indicated in dicta that public attorneys may 
be charged with official misconduct based on a violation of any “statute, 
supreme court rule, administrative rule or regulation, or tenet of the Code 
 
 
attorney disciplinary rules were “rules of [the Supreme] court promulgated under its 
exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law, [they] have the force and effect of 
substantive law.”  See id. at 745 (Dennis, J., concurring).  Louisiana courts have reached 
similar holdings in determining that police operations manuals and the state real estate 
commission’s ethical rules did not define legal duties such that their violation could be 
prosecuted as malfeasance.  See State v. Hessler, 570 So.2d 95, 96-97 (La. App. 1990) 
(police officer who failed to follow procedures for protecting prisoners, resulting in an 
assault on a prisoner in his charge, could not be prosecuted for malfeasance); see also State 
v. Passman, 391 So.2d 1140, 1144 (La. 1980) (director of real estate commission could not 
be prosecuted for issuing licenses to friends without regard to their test scores, because he 
had no express statutory duty to institute and practice fair testing procedures). 
162 See Clayton v. Willis, 489 So. 2d 813, 818-20 (Fla. App. 1986); see also notes 153-61 
infra and accompanying text (discussing Clayton at length). 
163 See La. Code ‘ 602.1609.  The Iowa judicial ethics code is otherwise based on the 1972 
ABA Model Code. 
164 See State v. Green, 376 A.2d 424, 427-28 (Del. Super. 1977).  The rule allegedly violated 
by the defendant required him to disclose loans received from any business subject to state 
regulation.  See id. at 428. 
165 See id. (noting that “[s]pecification of such ethical standards and appropriate sanctions 
for their violation is a legislative function, not one to be performed by a court in a 
prosecution for official misconduct”).  At least one Delaware court, however, has drawn a 
distinction in cases where the defendant profits personally from unethical conduct, holding 
that public officials have an inherent duty “not to profit personally from the services and 
property of [a] public agency.”  See Howell v. State, 421 A.2d 892, 897 (Del. 1980). 
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of Professional Responsibility.”166  Moreover, the Illinois courts have held 
that an administrative regulation need not contain an explicit penalty clause 
in order to form the basis of an indictment for official misconduct.167  This 
liability, however, is predicated upon the same reasoning set forth in 
Serstock - i.e., that an administrative agency acting under legislatively 
granted rule-making authority “gives expression to legislative policy.”168  
Given that the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct, unlike its ethical rules for 
attorneys, explicitly states that it is not intended as a basis for 
prosecution,169
Perhaps the only true exception outside New York to the general rule of 
non-prosecution for purely ethical violations is the state of Wisconsin.  
Two recent Court of Appeal decisions in Wisconsin have held that official 
misconduct prosecutions could be predicated on ethical rules or even 
employee handbooks.  In State v. Chvala,
 this rationale may preclude Illinois judges from being 
prosecuted for ethical violations only. 
170 the defendant, a state senator, 
was accused of using public employees to conduct private political work on 
behalf of himself and the Democratic Party.171  In October 2002, he was 
charged with official misconduct on the theory that, inter alia, the Senate 
Policy Manual prohibited legislative workers from being assigned to 
campaign work during duty hours.172
Citing a commission report providing that a public employee’s duty 
“may be imposed by common law, statute, municipal ordinance, regulation 
and perhaps other sources,” the Wisconsin Court of Appeal found that “a 
legislator’s duty under [the official misconduct statute] may be determined 
by. . . the Senate Policy Manual.”
 
173  Therefore, a legislative rule 
prohibiting “political activity [by state employees] during working hours,” 
combined with explanatory materials issued by the Clerk of the Senate, 
were found to define the defendant’s legal duties sufficiently for criminal 
liability.174  The companion case of State v. Jensen,175
 
166 See People v. Weber, 479 N.E.2d 382, 383 (Ill. App. 1985). 
 which involved 
167 See People v. Samel, 451 N.E.2d 892, 896-97 (Ill. App. 1983) (police officer could be 
charged with official misconduct for procuring “the name and address of a specified vehicle 
registration number owner by means of a computer check. . . for purposes other than law 
enforcement”). 
168 Id. at 896. 
169 See Ill. Sup. Ct. Rules, Art. I, Preamble (adopting the language of the 1990 ABA Model 
Code preamble). 
170 678 N.W.2d 880 (Wis. App. 2004). 
171 See id. at 885. 
172 See id. 
173 Id. at 888. 
174 See id. at 889; see also id. at 889-90 (finding that “[the defendant’s] duty as a legislator is 
sufficiently delineated in the Senate Policy Manual. . . such that a reasonable person would 
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similar charges against several Republican members of the State Assembly, 
likewise found that the Assembly Employee Handbook, various 
explanatory notes and an opinion of the State Ethics Board were sufficient 
sources of legal duty to form the basis of official misconduct charges.176
On June 22, 2004, the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted leave to appeal 
in both Chvala and Jensen.
 
177  Three of the seven judges recused 
themselves from consideration of the merits.178  The court’s 2005 decision 
was issued by the remaining four judges, two of whom voted to reverse on 
vagueness grounds while two voted to affirm.179  Because the court was 
evenly divided, the Court of Appeal rulings stood,180 but their value as 
precedent has been greatly weakened.181
Moreover, the Wisconsin cases are not entirely analogous to those 
involving judges, because the ethical rules of a legislature are 
distinguishable from those of the judiciary.  Given that the determination of 
criminal liability and punishment is a uniquely legislative province, a 
legislative body can be presumed to know what sanctions it intends to 
impose at the time it establishes a rule.  If the legislature believes that the 
sole sanction for rule violations should be internal discipline, it has full 
power to exempt its members from criminal liability.  Where legal and 
judicial ethics are at issue, however, silence is more ambiguous.  American 
case law to date provides slim support for the argument that codes of 
judicial ethics can form the basis of prosecution absent specific statutory 
authorization. 
 
 
be aware that using discretionary powers to obtain a dishonest advantage over others by 
waging partisan political campaigns with state resources violates one’s duty as a public 
official”). 
175 681 N.W.2d 230 (Wis. App. 2004). 
176 See id. at 239-40.  The language of the Assembly handbook  and explanatory memoranda 
were essentially identical to the Senate materials at issue in Chvala. 
177 See State v. Chvala, 684 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. 2004); State v. Jensen, 684 N.W.2d 136 
(Wis. 2004). 
178 See Steven Walters, Three Justices Recuse Themselves: Bare Majority to Hear Two 
Cases Involving Legislator Misconduct, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Jan. 6, 2005, p.B1.  
One of the three justices, David Prosser, stated that he was recusing himself because the 
defendants were former colleagues in the state legislature, while the other two justices did 
not specify their reasons for withdrawing.  See id. 
179 See State v. Chvala, 693 N.W.2d 747 (Wis. 2005); State v. Jensen, 694 N.W.2d 56 (Wis. 
2005). 
180 See id. 
181 See Phil Brinkman & Dee J. Hall, High Court Ruling Lets Criminal Cases Proceed: 
Deadlock on Key Issue Lets Appeals Decision Stand, Wisconsin State Journal, Mar. 24, 
2005, p.A1 (noting the lack of guidance provided by the Supreme Court rulings). 
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B. Possibility of Frivolous Prosecutions. 
Another concern cited by courts in limiting criminal liability is the 
possibility of prosecutions for minor, innocuous ethical violations.  
Although this possibility exists with respect to nearly all public ethical 
codes, it is especially great where legal or judicial ethics are concerned.  
This is because codes of ethics for lawyers and judges are, and are intended 
to be, expressions of values as well as concrete rules of conduct.182
The preamble to the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, for 
instance, states that  it contains both binding obligations and “hortatory 
rules,” designed to foster the principle that “judges. . . must respect and 
honor the judicial office as a public trust.”
 
183
The Code is designed to be adopted by appropriate agencies both as an 
inspirational guide to the members of the profession and as a basis for 
disciplinary action when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the required 
minimum standards stated in the Disciplinary Rules. . .
  The Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility is even more explicit: 
184
As such, even the mandatory Disciplinary Rules - which, unlike the 
Canons and Ethical Considerations, are explicitly intended to form the 
basis of disciplinary action
 
185 - contain such broad and generalized 
requirements as avoiding “even the appearance of impropriety”186 and 
refraining from the use of letterheads that are not “in dignified form.”187  
Likewise, judges cannot hold membership in organizations that practice 
unlawful discrimination188 and “shall be patient, dignified and courteous to 
litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others.”189
This concern was relied upon by the Florida Court of Appeals in Clayton 
v. Willis,
  If these are enforced as 
the basis of criminal liability, then discourteous judges or lawyers with 
undignified letterheads might potentially become felons. 
190
 
182 See notes 172-78 infra and accompanying text. 
 which granted an injunction prohibiting prosecution of a county 
judge for violation of ethical and procedural rules.  The defendant, Judge 
Wiley Clayton, had incurred the wrath of the district attorney by, inter alia, 
releasing criminal defendants on their own recognizance ex parte, 
conducting plea colloquies without the presence of the prosecution, and 
183 See ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble (1990). 
184 See ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Statement (1980). 
185 See id. 
186 Id., DR 9-101. 
187 Id., DR 2-102(A). 
188 See ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2(C) 
189 Id., Canon 3(B)(4). 
190 489 So. 2d 813 (Fla. App. 1986), rev. denied, 500 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1986). 
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failing to assess the minimum penalties for traffic offenses.191  Rather than 
referring these matters to the judicial disciplinary committee, the district 
attorney’s office indicted Clayton on 23 misdemeanor counts of 
misconduct in office, as well as two unrelated felony charges.192
As the Court of Appeal found, the charges against Judge Clayton 
represented an extraordinary abuse of power that “reveal[ed] the principal 
weakness of the grand jury system - the propensity of well-intentioned 
jurymen in the hands of an irresponsible prosecutor to be led down any 
path.”
 
193  Indeed, the prosecution was not brought under any statute but 
under the common law of England, which was incorporated into Florida 
criminal law in areas “where there is no existing provision by statute.”194  
After a survey of English cases dating from the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the Court of Appeal concluded that the common law crime of 
misconduct in office, when predicated on discretionary acts, required proof 
of a corrupt motive.195
This court is concerned about the prosecutor’s use of the indictment 
process in this case to level charges which are fatuous and patently 
without merit.  For example, in the absence of bribery or corrupt 
influence, it cannot be a crime for a judge to release a defendant on his 
own recognizance; it cannot be a crime to withhold adjudication of guilt 
or waive court appearances; it cannot be a crime to fail to have a court 
reporter present on all occasions; it cannot be a crime to amend a 
judgment or correct a record; it cannot be a crime to dismiss a case or to 
fail to fingerprint a defendant.  If these matters are crimes, virtually every 
judge in Florida, including the respondent, is subject to indictment at the 
whim and caprice of a disgruntled or ambitious state attorney.
  The court additionally found that, even if the 
common law offense could be interpreted to include such acts, it was 
unconstitutional as applied to violations of judicial ethics: 
196
The court “firmly reject[ed] and repudiate[d] these contentions”
 
197
 
191 See id. at 820-28 (reproducing the indictment). 
 and 
192 See id. at 814-15. 
193 See id. at 819. 
194 See id. at 816, citing Fla. Stat. ‘ 775.01.  The British cases cited by the court drew a 
distinction between nonfeasance, which could be prosecuted regardless of the defendant’s 
motive, and misfeasance, which required corrupt motive.  This distinction was drawn as 
early as Crouther’s Case, 2 Hawk P.C. 116 (Q.B. 1599), which held that a constable could 
be indicted for failing to raise a hue and cry upon learning that a burglary had been 
committed at night.  In contrast, “[t]he only punishment at common law for nonministerial, 
discretionary acts was impeachment, absent corrupt circumstances.”  Clayton, 489 So. 2d at 
817, citing 1 William L. Burdick, The Law of Crime, ‘ 272a (1946). 
195 See Clayton, 489 So. 2d at 817. 
196 Id. at 818-19. 
197 Id. at 819. 
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adamantly stated that the criminal courts are not the place to deal with such 
trivialities.  Accordingly, it dismissed the charges against Judge Clayton, 
without prejudice to consideration by a judicial disciplinary board.198
C. Separation of Powers. 
 
Separation of powers is a concern in any criminal prosecution brought 
against a public employee, but especially so where the defendant is a judge.  
In cases where administrative officials or law enforcement officers are 
prosecuted, the executive branch is prosecuting members of a different 
agency.  A criminal prosecution of a judge, however, sets up a direct 
confrontation between the executive and the judiciary.  As such, this raises 
the possibility selective prosecution by the executive to intimidate judges 
or to punish judges whose attitudes and rulings are deemed contrary to 
government interests. 
Separation of powers concerns, along with the need to prevent frivolous 
prosecutions, played a critical part in the Clayton decision.  The opinion of 
the Florida Court of Appeal was permeated with the concern that 
“disgruntled or ambitious” prosecutors might take advantage of nebulous 
ethical rules to intimidate or obtain revenge against judges.199  Terming the 
case a “classic example of. . . misuse of the judicial process for political 
purposes,”200 the court concluded its holding by “observ[ing] that the 
complete independence of the judiciary of this country is essential to the 
preservation of the Constitution.”201  The court stated further that “[i]t 
should never be forgotten that one of the first charges in contained in the 
Declaration of Independence was that the tyrannical sovereign. . . made 
Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices.”202  
Therefore, in order to protect the constitutional separation of powers, the 
Clayton court required proof of a corrupt motive where a judge was 
charged with common-law misfeasance as opposed to an offense defined 
by statute.203
Likewise, in Serstock, the Minnesota Supreme Court cited separation of 
 
 
198 Indeed, when the matter came before a proper disciplinary forum, the only sanction 
levied upon Judge Clayton was a reprimand.  See In re Clayton, 504 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 1987).  
He subsequently resigned from the bench. 
199 See Clayton, 489 So. 2d at 819. 
200 Id. at 818. 
201 Id. at 819, citing In re Proposed Disciplinary Action, 103 So. 2d 632, 634 (Fla. 1958) 
(finding that the Florida Bar could not institute disciplinary proceedings against a judge for 
the sole purpose of removing him from office). 
202 Id. at 819-20. 
203 See id. at 817-18. 
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powers concerns in dismissing a case brought against a deputy city 
attorney.204  Although the city attorney’s office was part of the executive 
rather than the judicial branch, any prosecution predicated on violations of 
the code of legal ethics implicated the courts’ authority over disciplinary 
actions against attorneys.205  Specifically, the court was “concerned that 
adopting the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules on 
Professional Conduct as a guideline for the misconduct statute would 
disrupt this court’s sole authority to determine attorney discipline.”206  In 
other words, prosecution of public attorneys for ethical violations alone 
would, at least under some circumstances, place prosecutors or lower 
courts in the position of arbiters of legal ethics, and would undermine the 
Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction to construe ethical rules.207
In Chvala and Jensen, though, the Wisconsin Court of Appeal, whose 
decisions were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, held that 
separation of powers did not bar prosecution of legislators for violation of 
the legislative code of ethics.  In Chvala, the defendants, who were 
members of the Wisconsin State Senate, contended that the separation of 
powers doctrine precluded them from being prosecuted for violating Senate 
policies regarding the personal use of legislative staff.
 
208  The Court of 
Appeal, however, determined that the separation of powers considerations 
relevant to prosecution of legislators were embodied in the “speech and 
debate” clause of the Wisconsin Constitution, which protected only acts 
integral to the legislative process.209  Accordingly, the court found that the 
use of Wisconsin Senate staff for private campaign work, in violation of 
Senate ethical rules, was not an activity protected by the speech and debate 
clause.210
The Court of Appeal also engaged in an analysis of whether the 
prosecution of legislators for violating internal rules would infringe on the 
legislature’s “core area of authority,” either through executive interference 
with the legislature’s functioning or through the judicial interpretation of 
legislative rules.
 
211
 
204 See State v. Serstock, 402 N.W.2d 514, 516-17 (Minn. 1987). 
  It determined that, since the rules in question involved 
public funds and were not integral to the legislative process, they fell 
205 See id. at 517 n.2. 
206 Id. 
207 See id. 
208 See Chvala, 678 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Wis. App. 2004). 
209 Id. at 892-93, citing Wis. Const. art. IV, ‘ 16. 
210 Id. at 893-94 (stating, inter alia, that “Chvala is not being prosecuted for his legislative 
acts or for personnel decisions integral to the execution of those acts”). 
211 See id. at 894. 
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within a zone of power shared by the executive branch.212  Moreover, 
because the legislative rules were clear on their face, their interpretation by 
the courts would violate no constitutional prerogative of the legislature.213  
The companion case of State v. Jensen,214 which involved substantially 
similar prosecutions directed at members of the Wisconsin House of 
Representatives, engaged in identical analysis and conclusions with respect 
to House rules.215
It should be noted, though, that even the Chvala and Jensen courts 
indicated that separation of powers might bar prosecution for ethical 
violations under certain circumstances - i.e., where the ethical rules in 
question involve core areas of a non-executive branch’s power.
 
216  In the 
case of the judiciary, separation of powers might therefore bar official 
misconduct prosecutions predicated on violation of ethical rules that are 
integral to the process of judging.  These would include, inter alia, rules 
requiring judges to be faithful to the law in rendering decisions, to maintain 
order and decorum in the courtroom or to refrain from engaging in certain 
ex parte communications.217  This means that, even under the Chvala 
rationale, it is likely that a court would look askance at a prosecution such 
as that in Clayton, where a vengeful prosecutor essentially indicted a judge 
for making erroneous legal decisions.218
Chvala and Jensen, which involved legislators, are also distinguishable 
in other respects from cases involving judges. Given that legislators have 
the power to enact and repeal criminal statutes, they are in a unique 
position to determine the scope and application of such statutes.  If a state 
legislature wishes to rewrite the state’s official misconduct statute so as to 
preclude prosecutions of its members for violating internal ethical rules, it 
can do so at any time.  Thus, since legislators control the degree to which 
such statutes apply to them, separation of powers concerns are less of a 
concern when they are prosecuted.  In contrast, judges cannot unilaterally 
rewrite criminal statutes, and  separation of powers considerations become 
especially compelling when they are prosecuted by executive officials 
based on a broad interpretation of a statute enacted by the legislature. 
 
Moreover, given that executive agencies have more day-to-day 
 
212 See id. 
213 See id. 
214 681 N.W.2d 230 (Wis. App. 2004). 
215 See id. at 244-45. 
216 See Chvala, 678 N.W.2d at 893; see also Jensen, 681 N.W.2d at 244. 
217 See, e.g., 22 NYCRR ‘ 100.3 (setting forth ethical obligations of New York judges with 
respect to courtroom conduct). 
218 See notes 179-87 supra and accompanying text. 
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interaction with the courts than with the legislature, the potential for a 
chilling effect from cross-branch prosecutions is greater when a judge is 
charged.  Legislatures establish the legal and policy framework within the 
executive must operate, but the courts scrutinize - and sometimes overturn - 
its daily activities.  Thus, an adversarial mindset often develops within the 
executive in which courts are seen as obstructing justice.219
It is, of course, necessary to prosecute judges on certain occasions.  
Judges are no more above the law than members of the executive and 
legislative branches, and a judge who engages in bribe receiving or similar 
criminal conduct threatens the integrity of the government as a whole.  
Nevertheless, separation of powers considerations argue compellingly in 
favor of limiting such prosecutions to cases where judges are given clear 
statutory warning that their acts are subject to criminal penalty. 
  As such, it is 
exceptionally important that boundaries on prosecuting judges be created 
and enforced. 
IV. CIRCUMSCRIBING THE PROSECUTION OF JUDGES: A PRUDENTIAL 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY. 
It is apparent from the above that American courts have shown great 
reluctance to expand the scope of prosecutorial discretion in cases 
involving judges.  Indeed, in the absence of a clear penal statute, the courts 
have been even less willing to hold judges criminally liable for official 
misconduct than they have with public officials from the executive and 
legislative branches.  It is contended that this reluctance is entirely 
appropriate in light of the policies underlying criminal law, the practical 
concern with preventing vindictive prosecutions and, constitutional 
principles of judicial independence, and that the New York Court of 
Appeals’ decision in Garson represents a dangerous departure from sound 
precedent. 
1. Criminal Liability For Violations Of Judicial Ethics Would Not 
Serve The Purpose Of The Criminal Law. 
Professor Sanford Kadish has argued that “the criminal law is a highly 
specialized tool of social control. . . that when improperly used is capable 
of producing more evil than good.”220
 
219 See, e.g., Aviva Abramovsky, Traitors in Our Midst: Attorneys who Inform on Their 
Clients, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 676, 688 (2000) (discussing prosecutors who view the criminal 
justice system as an impediment). 
  Historically, the criminal law has 
220 See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & 
Soc. Sci. 157, 169 (1967). 
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“expressed both a moral and a practical judgment about the societal 
consequences of certain activity.”221  This judgment was twofold: that the 
act was inherently immoral, and that it caused harm to society at large 
rather than only to particular individuals.222  In contrast, wrongs done to 
specific individuals without culpable intent were “for amelioration in the 
tort system.”223
Over time, a third category of prohibited conduct arose: behavior that 
was not intrinsically immoral but was regulated “to serve some perceived 
public good.”
 
224  Typically, this behavior was controlled through civil and 
administrative regulations.225  In recent decades, however, criminal 
sanctions have increasingly encroached into the regulatory and tort spheres, 
prompting the criticism that the law has become “overcriminalized.”226
As set forth above, American rules of judicial ethics generally fell into 
the category of administrative or regulatory offenses, to be punished by 
professional discipline.
 
227  This may be due in part to the fact that the rules 
contained in ethical codes go far beyond what is traditionally viewed as 
immoral.  Many rules of judicial ethics are designed to maintain the 
decorum and public stature of the judiciary rather than to prevent immoral 
conduct.228  Others were designed to “put a fence around the law”229 - i.e., 
to prohibit conduct that appears improper or is conducive to impropriety 
while not being immoral in itself.230  Thus, criminal enforcement was 
reserved for acts specifically made punishable by the legislature, while 
enforcement of other ethical regulations was left to courts and professional 
disciplinary boards.231
The extension of criminal penalties to such essentially regulatory 
 
 
221 Paul Rosenzweig, The Over-Criminalization of Social and Economic Conduct, 27 
Champion 28, 29 (2003). 
222 See id. at 29-30. 
223 Id. at 29. 
224 See id. 
225 See id. at 30-31. 
226 See id. 
227 See notes 94-103 supra and accompanying text. 
228 See, e.g., 22 NYCRR ‘‘ 100.2(a) (requiring judges to act in a manner that promotes 
public confidence in the judiciary), 100.3(b)(2) (requiring judges to be “patient, dignified 
and courteous” to litigants, counsel, witnesses and court personnel). 
229 The concept of putting a fence around the law originates with rabbinic rulings that 
imposed rules and restrictions greater than what the law required, in order to prevent people 
from straying into gray areas where they might inadvertently break the law.  See Moses 
Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 24:4, at 73 (outlining the concept of placing a fence 
around the law by means of extralegal sanctions). 
230 See, e.g., 22 NYCRR ‘ 100.3(b)(6) (prohibiting improper ex parte conversations). 
231 See notes 94-103 supra and accompanying text. 
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offenses poses serious problems of equity.232
(1) excessive unchecked discretion in enforcement authorities, (2) 
inevitable disparity among similarly situated persons, (3) potential for 
abuse by enforcement authorities, (4) potential to undermine other 
significant values and evade significant procedural protections, and (5) 
misdirection of scarce resources (opportunity costs).
  Professor Sara Sun Beale has 
noted that “common features of overcriminalization” include the following 
five pitfalls: 
233
If the discretion of law enforcement authorities is sufficiently 
unrestrained, criminal penalties for such regulatory offenses may be “so 
wantonly and so freakishly imposed that [they are] like being hit by 
lightning.”
 
234
Overcriminalization and its attendant ills also offend the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege, or “no crime without law.”
 
235  Since regulatory 
offenses tend to be broadly defined and subject to discretionary 
enforcement,236 they are vulnerable to judicial expansion without adequate 
warning to defendants.237  This is especially so in the case of an offense 
such as the New York official misconduct statute, which is subject to 
almost limitless  expansion depending on prosecutors’ and courts’ 
interpretation of the “duties of a public servant.”238  Such judicial 
interpretation, if left unchecked, can effectively amount to ex post facto 
lawmaking.239
 
232 See generally Sara Sun Beale, From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 
Am. U. L. Rev. 747 (2005). 
 
233 Id. at 749. 
234 Id. at 758. 
235 See John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White-Collar Crime, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 579, 
589-90 (2005). 
236 See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 Va. L. Rev. 879, 885 
(2004). 
237 See Hasnas, supra note 224, at 589. 
238 See notes 43-48 supra and accompanying text. 
239 See Hasnas, supra note 224, at 589-90.  Professor Hasnas identifies four corollaries to the 
principle of nulla crimen sine lege: 
 “(1) a ban on retroactive criminal lawmaking; (2) a ban on the judicial creation of new 
common law crimes; (3) a requirement that a criminal offense is clearly enough defined to 
give citizens adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited and to establish clear guidelines 
governing law  enforcement; and (4) a requirement that the language of a criminal offense 
be strictly construed in favor of the defendant (the rule of lenity).” 
Id.  He contends that the combination of these rules prevents ex post facto punishment and is 
“reflective of the central values of liberal societies.”  See id. at 590.  Another commentator 
has similarly argued that the doctrine of nulla poena sine lege consists of “1) making 
statutory law the exclusive source of criminalization; 2) prohibition of criminalization by 
analogy; 3) prohibition of ex post facto laws; and 4) a requirement of definiteness of 
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The excesses of overcriminalization frequently result from prosecutorial 
authorities’ attempts to expand their duties from the punishment of crime to 
more general protection of the public good.240  Such a “policy-oriented 
approach in the area of criminal law runs contrary to the fundamental 
customary principle nullum crimen sine lege.”241  Indeed, the signs of such 
a policy-based approach in the Garson case are apparent from the 
majority’s arguments for applying criminal sanction to violations of 
judicial ethics.242  Specifically, the majority contended that criminal 
sanctions were necessary to protect the integrity of the bench, assist state 
agencies in maintaining clean government and maintain public confidence 
in the judiciary.243
 By claiming the right to act in furtherance of these goals and 
interpreting the official misconduct statute accordingly, the Kings County 
District Attorney’s office effectively assumed a regulatory mandate despite 
the fact that the sanctions at its command were inappropriate for such a 
role.  And as Judge Smith noted in his dissent to Garson, the majority 
essentially endorsed the Kings County prosecutors’ claim to be the primary 
enforcer of these regulatory goals, by making the prosecution “the judge of 
when and how a rule of judicial conduct becomes criminal.”
  These are fundamentally regulatory goals, of the type 
that are commonly achieved through civil and administrative enforcement 
and professional discipline. 
244
Prosecutors’ assumption of a regulatory mandate may also lead to 
overcriminalization in that they lack the technical expertise to regulate the 
bench.  If prosecutions for violations of judicial ethical codes are permitted, 
relatively few cases are likely to come to prosecutors’ attention directly.  
Instead, as with the Garson case, the matters will be brought to the 
prosecutors’ notice by disgruntled parties or counsel.  In order to determine 
whether to bring charges in such cases, the prosecutors will have to sift 
through conflicting accounts of the incident and determine whether the 
judge has acted permissibly or crossed the line into unethical conduct. 
 
This is not a task that criminal prosecutors are equipped to perform, 
particularly where the judge’s conduct falls into a gray area in the ethical 
 
criminal statutes.”  See Stanislaw Pomorski, Reflections on the First Criminal Code of Post-
Communist Russia, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 375, 384 (1998). 
240 See Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, Responsibility of Individuals for Human 
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Postivist View, 93 A.J.I.L. 302, 303 (1999). 
241 See id. 
242 See Garson III, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 616, *20-21. 
243 See id. at *21 (“The Rules are a compendium of regulations that insures the integrity of 
the judiciary and the resultant confidence and impartiality that must repose in the justice 
system”). 
244 See Garson III, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 616, at *59 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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code.  The difficulty of resolving such ambiguous conduct has been noted 
in the related area of attorney ethics, particularly where an attorney’s 
ethical obligations intersect with the criminal law.245  Specifically, it has 
been noted that attorneys who assert privilege over corporate documents in 
the context of criminal investigations have sometimes been treated by 
prosecutors as conspirators in a cover-up.246  In such circumstances, it has 
been noted that “there are often real difficulties in determining whether 
[attorneys’ conduct] should be treated as a crime. . . a tort, a violation of 
procedural rules, a professional ethics violation, or as merely aggressive 
(and perhaps even commendable) litigation tactics.”247
The judging process is not immune from such ethical gray areas.  
Although judges are required to refrain from partiality,
 
248 they are by no 
means passive actors in the litigation process.249  Twentieth-century 
reforms to American rules of civil procedure have increasingly cast judges 
as “manager[s] of the case,” with an active role in moving the litigation 
through the pretrial process and facilitating a settlement.250
The limits of this facilitating role are in controversy within the judicial 
profession.  Some commentators, for instance, argue that judges are entitled 
to conduct ex parte conversations with litigants during settlement 
negotiations, including discussion of the reasonableness of settlement 
offers and the probable strength of their opponents’ case.
 
251  Others, in 
stark contrast, believe that such conduct is unethical and amounts to 
coercion of the parties and their attorneys.252  This dispute cannot be 
resolved by reference to the plain language of the code of judicial ethics, 
since the rule governing ex parte communications does not explicitly speak 
to settlement negotiations.253
 
245 See Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 9, 13 
(2005). 
  Indeed, the rule contains a catchall exception 
permitting judges to “initiate and consider ex parte communications when 
authorized by law to do so,” thus providing courts with authority to 
246 See id. 
247 See id. 
248 See 22 NYCRR ‘ 100.3(b)(1). 
249 See R. Lawrence Dessem, The Civil Justice Reform Act: The Role of the Federal 
Magistrate Judge in Civil Justice Reform, 67 St. John’s L. Rev. 799, 800 (1993). 
250 See Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of 
Public Institutions, 1983 Duke L.J. 1265, 1271 (1983). 
251 See Steven Flanders, Blind Umpires: A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 Hastings L.J. 
505, 511-14 (1984) (describing the debate within the judicial profession about how 
aggressively a judge is entitled to facilitate settlements). 
252 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harvard L. Rev. 376, 413 (1982). 
253 See 22 NYCRR ‘ 100.3(b)(6). 
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adjudicate the ethical boundaries of such communications.254
Given the uncertain boundaries of permissible ex parte communication 
by judges, the bludgeon of criminal liability is uniquely unsuited to enforce 
these limits.  Moreover, prosecutors’ offices lack the technical expertise to 
make judgments about when judges may communicate ex parte and when 
they may not.  This is a judgment more appropriately made by judicial 
conferences and disciplinary boards and enforced through rulemaking and 
professional discipline.  It is not the kind of dispute that can or should be 
resolved by prosecutors acting on the complaint of parties or attorneys who 
feel that a judge has wronged them.  Applying the criminal law in these and 
similar areas constitutes the inappropriate use of criminal sanction by an 
authority not technically equipped for regulatory enforcement.  This can 
hardly be described as fair either to the judicial process or the judges who 
face such inappropriate criminal charges.
 
255
2. Prosecutions For Judicial Ethics Violations Would Chill Impartial 
Judging. 
 
The possibility of vindictive prosecutions, as exemplified by the Clayton 
case,256 would likewise constitute a great concern if prosecutors had open-
ended discretion to indict judges for ethical violations.  Indeed, 
prosecutions of sitting judges even for explicitly criminal conduct are 
controversial, at least in the Federal context.  Since the United States 
Constitution guarantees Federal judges life tenure and provides a specific 
means of removal via impeachment,257 it has been argued that the 
Government is constitutionally forbidden from prosecuting judges unless 
and until they have been impeached.258
Although life tenure is not guaranteed to most state judges, impeachment 
or similar removal procedures are contained in most state constitutions.  In 
addition, the interests protected by such procedures - i.e., judicial 
independence and separation of powers - are recognized as fundamental 
 
 
254 See 22 NYCRR ‘ 100.3(b)(6)(e). 
255 See Garson III, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 616, *59-60 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
judges may now risk criminal liability, at the discretion of prosecutors, if they “advise[] a 
relative or friend that a particularl lawyer is well suited to handle a case” or where they 
“recommend one [law] school over another”). 
256 See notes 179-87 supra and accompanying text. 
257 See U.S. Const. art. III, ‘ 1 (stating that judges shall hold office “during their good 
behavior”); art. II, ‘ 4 (specifying impeachment as the procedure for removing all “civil 
officers of the United States”). 
258 See generally Steven W. Gold, Temporary Criminal Immunity for Federal Judges: A 
Constitutional Requirement, 53 Brooklyn L. Rev. 699 (1987). 
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state constitutional values.259
Some commentators have contended that separation of powers and 
judicial independence can be adequately protected by prosecutorial 
discretion.  In the aftermath of the impeachment of United States District 
Judge Alcee Hastings, for instance, former Justice Department prosecutor 
Reid H. Weingarten argued that the exacting centralized review processes 
of the Department of Justice would preclude the possibility of vindictive 
prosecutions.
  The same considerations that militate against 
prosecution of sitting Federal judges are present whenever a judge is 
subjected to prosecution, regardless of the jurisdiction in which charges are 
filed. 
260  Given that the rulings of the Federal judiciary have 
become an increasingly politically charged issue, and given that the 
ultimate decision as to whether to prosecute a Federal judge lies with a 
politically appointed Attorney General, there is some room to quibble with 
Weingarten’s conclusion.  Even if Weingarten is correct in the Federal 
context, however, many or even most state prosecutorial agencies do not 
have a review process similar to that undertaken by the Department of 
Justice.  In many states, including New York, criminal prosecutions are 
conducted primarily by county officials,261
The history of the removal processes that do exist in New York provides 
empirical evidence that local prosecutors have been willing to use them for 
vindictive purposes.  One of the most striking examples is that of former 
Kings County Supreme Court Justice Lorin Duckman.
 who are answerable only to 
their county electorates and are not subject to meaningful review by higher 
officials.  As such, there are fewer constraints on local prosecutors who 
might be tempted to indict judges in order to pursue political rivalries or 
remove judges who rule against them too frequently. 
262  Judge Duckman 
aroused the opposition of the District Attorney’s office due to his perceived 
leniency toward criminal defendants and brusqueness with prosecutors.  
Accordingly, the District Attorney began to keep a dossier on Judge 
Duckman, obtaining transcripts of numerous court appearances in order to 
use them against him at an opportune time.263
Such an opportune occasion arose when Justice Duckman granted the 
 
 
259 See notes 179-208 supra and accompanying text. 
260 See Reid H. Weingarten, Judicial Misconduct: A View From the Department of Justice, 
76 Ky. L.J. 799 (1988). 
261 See N.Y. Const. art. XIII, ‘‘ 13(a)-(c).  Although the New York State Attorney General 
may also conduct prosecutions under certain circumstances, his power is limited by Section 
63 of the New York Executive Law, and the primary prosecuting authorities are the county 
district attorneys. 
262 See In re Duckman, 92 N.Y.2d 141 (1998). 
263 See id. at 158 (Titone, J., dissenting). 
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routine bail application of Benito Oliver, who appeared in his court on 
misdemeanor charges.264  Three weeks later, while he was out on bail, 
Oliver fatally shot his girlfriend, Galina Komar.265  The shooting prompted 
a media storm focusing on Judge Duckman, whose perceived leniency 
toward Oliver was portrayed as a contributing cause of Komar’s death.266
The lurid newspaper coverage was followed only a few days later by a 
letter from the State Senate Majority Leader to the State Commission on 
Judicial Conduct demanding that petitioner’s fitness be investigated 
immediately.  At the same time, Governor Pataki initiated his own 
“investigation” of petitioner. These actions by two of the State’s most 
powerful elected officials were part of a larger political climate in which 
Judges were increasingly being scapegoated. Beginning around the time 
of the Komar killing and continuing throughout the spring and fall of 
1996, journalists specializing in sensational reportage and politicians 
anxious to capitalize on public fear combined to lay the blame for urban 
crime at the feet of “criminal coddling” Judges. 
  
Former Judge Vito Titone of the New York Court of Appeals described the 
ensuing events: 
As the onslaught from the media continued, the Governor’s office sent 
representatives to the Kings and Bronx County District Attorneys offices, 
apparently to obtain additional negative background material on Judge 
Duckman. These representatives were given access to one or more files 
containing transcripts of proceedings before Judge Duckman, which 
appear to have been ordered and preserved for some unspecified future 
use. Notably, some of these transcripts involving dismissed criminal 
charges were shown to the Governor’s investigators without regard to the 
confidentiality rules that apply to sealed records. Having collected a list of 
complaints from trial assistants about petitioner’s handling of their cases 
and his mistreatment of individual prosecutors, the investigators compiled 
a nine-page report that was ultimately forwarded to the Judicial Conduct 
Commission.267
This was followed by an ultimatum from Governor Pataki to the  New 
York Commission on Judicial Conduct, demanding that it “remove [Justice 
Duckman] from office within 60 days or the Governor would initiate 
impeachment proceedings before the State Senate.”
 
268
 
264 See id. 
  The Commission 
quickly buckled to the pressure of the Governor and the Legislature and 
initiated disciplinary proceedings against Justice Duckman.  Those 
265 See id. 
266 See id. 
267 Id. at 158-59. 
268 See id. at 159-60. 
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proceedings ended, as preordained, with the judge’s removal.269
The disciplinary sanction was ultimately upheld by a 5-2 majority of the 
New York Court of Appeals.
 
270
The implication of the present disciplinary proceeding is that Judges 
whose rulings displease the political powers that be may be subjected to a 
modern-day witch hunt in which their records are combed for 
indiscretions, their peccadillos strung together to make out a “substantial 
record” of misconduct and their judicial “sins” punished with the ultimate 
sanction of removal from office. Indeed, in this case, the inference that 
petitioner has been removed at least in part because of his interest in 
protecting individual defendants’ rights is reinforced by the 
Commission’s emphasis on his purportedly antiprosecution bias and his 
statements criticizing the District Attorneys’ policies. It is clearly contrary 
to the goal of judicial independence to suggest that a Judge may be 
singled out for discipline because of his or her expressed views on 
questions affecting the criminal justice system.
  In a strong dissent, however, Judge Titone 
noted the ominous connotations of the events surrounding Justice 
Duckman’s removal: 
271
Noting that “[t]here are few among us who have the courage and 
fortitude to take judicial stands at the risk of public humiliation and loss of 
office,” Judge Titone warned that the proceeding would have a chilling 
effect on judicial independence in New York.
 
272  As he stated, “[a] 
precedent has now been set in which politicians and local prosecutors have 
demanded the removal of a widely respected sitting Judge for what they 
perceived as ‘criminal coddling’ and have succeeded in that demand.”273
In at least three other cases, New York judges have faced other sanctions 
based on unpopular rulings.  One such instance is the case of former 
Criminal Court Judge Bruce Wright, dubbed “Turn ‘Em Loose Bruce” by 
New York City law enforcement officials due to his lenient bail rulings.
 
274  
After Judge Wright released the accused shooter of a police officer on bail, 
pressure from the police union resulted in his permanent reassignment to 
civil cases.275
 
269 See id. at 160. 
  A more recent example is the case of Judge Laura 
Blackburne, a New York County Supreme Court judge who assisted a 
270 See id. at 145. 
271 Id. at 160 (Titone, J., dissenting). 
272 See id. 
273 Id. at 161 (emphasis in original). 
274 See Stuart S. Nagel, Policy Evaluation and Criminal Justice, 50 Brooklyn L. Rev. 53, 61 
n.16 (1983). 
275 See Tom Goldstein, New York City Bar Association to Probe Reassignment of Criminal 
Court Judge, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1974, p.34. 
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defendant in avoiding arrest by detectives who had come to the courthouse 
to enforce an unrelated bench warrant.276  As with Judge Wright, a 
combination of media coverage and political pressure prompted her 
administrative reassignment to a civil part.277
Even Federal judges have not been immune from political pressure over 
pro-defense rulings in criminal cases.  One such instance in New York 
occurred when Judge Harold Baer issued a ruling suppressing evidence in 
the cocaine trafficking prosecution of Carol Bayless.
 
278  What made this 
ruling even more controversial than most Fourth Amendment suppression 
rulings was that Judge Baer characterized running from the police as an act 
that was not inherently suspicious and could, under certain circumstances, 
be reasonable.279  The matter caught the attention of Congress, and after 
impeachment proceedings were threatened, Judge Baer seized upon a 
prosecutorial reargument motion to reverse himself.280
These four examples demonstrate, it is that judges who issue pro-defense 
rulings in criminal cases can often find themselves in the political line of 
fire.  This has the potential to form a perverse synergy with the interests of 
prosecutors, who are frequent users of the courts in criminal cases and who 
benefit from any chilling effect on pro-defense rulings.  The availability of 
sanctions such as removal, impeachment and reassignment already creates 
the potential for such a chilling effect, but the effect would be enormously 
magnified if prosecutors could directly sanction disfavored judges by 
means of criminal indictment.  This would not only place the ability to 
enforce political pressure in the hands of those who would benefit the most 
from its success, but it would threaten judges with the possibility of losing 
their freedom as well as their livelihoods. 
 
 
276 See Scott Shifrel et. al., Judge Taken Down a Notch, Daily News (N.Y.), June 15, 2004, 
p.5. 
277 See id. 
278 See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
279 See id. at 241-42 (noting, inter alia, that residents of the neighborhood where the alleged 
offense occurred “tended to regard police officers as corrupt, abusive and violent”). 
280 See United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  For details of the 
political fallout from Judge Baer’s original ruling, see United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 
116, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that “the language in the opinion, referring as it did to 
widespread police corruption, was perceived by many as an affront to the police and to 
victims of drug-related crime.”).  The Second Circuit noted that the ruling became “a 
flashpoint for the 1996 Presidential campaign” prompting threats of impeachment and calls 
for Judge Baer’s resignation, and that President Clinton “defer[red] deciding whether to call 
for Judge Baer’s resignation until the Judge ruled on the government’s motion for 
reconsideration.”  See id.  President Clinton’s statement was interpreted by much of the 
media and the judiciary as “a veiled warning” that “if [the judge] did not reverse a widely 
criticized decision throwing out drug evidence, the President might ask for his resignation.”  
Id. 
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The ability to indict judges for ethical violations in the absence of a clear 
penal statute governing their actions would open the door to exactly this 
scenario.  Under the theory advocated by the Kings County District 
Attorney and endorsed by the majority in the Garson case, for instance, 
Justice Duckman could have been prosecuted on misdemeanor charges for 
discourtesy to Assistant District Attorneys and erroneous dismissals of 
criminal cases, both of which were cited as ethical violations by the 
Commission on Judicial Conduct in removing him.281  Moreover, under the 
broadly worded provisions of the Penal Law, it would be of no moment 
that the official misconduct statute requires proof that the defendant 
intended to acquire a benefit or deprive another of a benefit.  Given that the 
term “benefit” encompasses gain or advantage to third parties, a 
hypothetical prosecutor could argue that Judge Duckman intended to confer 
the “benefit” of erroneous dismissal upon the defendants who came before 
him, or that he intended to deprive the District Attorney’s office of the 
“benefit” of due process of law.282
Judge Blackburne would be likewise be indictable under the Garson 
majority’s formulation of the law.  Specifically, she could be charged with 
official misconduct on the basis that she violated the Rules of Judicial 
Conduct with the intent that the defendant “benefit” by avoiding arrest.
 
283  
In other words, the door would be opened to exactly the sort of vindictive 
prosecutions undertaken by the Florida prosecutor in Clayton.  New York 
judges would be on notice that a sharp word to an Assistant District 
Attorney, or an erroneous pro-defense ruling later judged unethical at the 
discretion of the prosecutor, could potentially lead to jail time.284
Indeed, even unsuccessful prosecutions would have a chilling effect.  
The very process of commencing a criminal investigation against a judge 
would necessarily impact his ability to function impartially on the bench, 
and the necessity of defending against criminal charges would deplete his 
time and financial resources.  The commencement of a criminal 
investigation for ethical lapses, even if it does not ultimately lead to 
conviction, could be an effective method of harassing disfavored judges in 
the event that such prosecutions are allowed. 
 
Moreover, as Weingarten notes, the process of investigating a judge 
 
281 See In re Duckman, 92 N.Y.2d 141, 145 (1998) 
282 See notes 105-08 supra and accompanying text. 
283 See notes 276-77 supra and accompanying text. 
284 Needless to say, judges who are discourteous to criminal defense attorneys would not run 
a similar risk, as defense counsel would not have the power to file criminal charges on their 
own initiative.  Prosecutors, and prosecutors alone, would effectively become the arbiters of 
judicial decorum in the courtroom. 
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necessarily involves intrusion into his chambers.285  This could potentially 
impact the integrity of the judging process, especially if judges become 
aware that their chambers might be under surveillance.  Moreover, 
surveillance of chambers could affect the rights of innocent parties to 
litigation, in the event that recorded chambers discussions are disclosed and 
made public during the course of a criminal proceeding.286
Therefore, an investigation that involves the traditionally confidential 
precincts of judicial chambers must involve a balancing of rights: society’s 
interest in rooting out judicial corruption must be weighed against judicial 
independence and litigants’ right to privacy.  If there is evidence that a 
judge has committed an explicitly criminal act, such as accepting bribes or 
extorting kickbacks, then the intrusion on these individual rights is 
warranted.  On the other hand, where the violation in question is merely 
ethical, the privacy interests of judges and litigants weigh much more 
heavily, and the resolution of such matters should be left to less intrusive 
administrative or disciplinary processes. 
 
3. Separation Of Powers Considerations Militate Against Holding 
Judges Criminally Liable For Mere Ethical Violations. 
The considerations counseling against an expansive interpretation of 
violations of judicial ethics as criminal offenses are also constitutional.  
Chief among them, as the Court of Appeals stated in La Carrubba, is the 
fact that designation of criminal offenses is a fundamentally legislative 
function that cannot be delegated even explicitly.287  The Legislature could, 
within the scope of its powers, make it a crime for a public official to 
disobey an existing code of ethics or administrative rule.288
Therefore, in the absence of actual legislative review and adoption of an 
existing ethical code as an element of a criminal offense, any imposition of 
criminal liability for violating administratively promulgated ethical rules 
would constitute an improper delegation.  Indeed, the theory advocated by 
the prosecution in Garson, and endorsed by the Court of Appeals majority, 
involved several layers of delegation rather than only one.  Specifically, the 
  However, 
absent such an explicit pronouncement by the Legislature itself, a criminal 
offense cannot simply be implied based on the intersection of an ethical 
code and a broadly worded official misconduct statute. 
 
285 See Weingarten, supra note 247, at 806. 
286 See id. 
287 See People v. La Carrubba, 46 N.Y.2d 658, 665 (1979). 
288 See, e.g., People v. Blanchard, 288 N.Y. 145 (1942) (upholding penal statute that 
criminalized violation of the New York City Sanitary Code). 
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theory began with an official misconduct statute that made it a crime for a 
public servant to receive or agree to receive a “benefit” in return for 
violating his duty.  The prosecution then cited an amendment of the New 
York State Constitution, adopted considerably after the official misconduct 
statute was enacted, that made judges “subject” to the rules of the Chief 
Administrator of the Courts.  The final layer was the ethical code itself, 
which was promulgated by the Chief Administrator some time after the 
constitutional amendment. 
Significantly, as noted by Judge Smith in his dissent, the Legislature did 
not indicate at any point during this process that it intended to criminalize 
ethical violations as such.289  At the time the official misconduct statute 
was incorporated into the New York Penal Law, there was no statewide 
code of ethics for judges, and there had been no attempts to prosecute 
judges for violation of the then-existing Appellate Division ethical rules.  
Indeed, as noted by Professor Nelson, the very idea of regulating judicial 
ethics through formal disciplinary rules was a relatively new one at the 
time.290  There was no indication that, at the time the Legislature enacted 
the Penal Law, it intended anything more than a synthesis of previous 
statutes punishing specific and narrow types of misconduct by public 
servants.291
Nor, at the time of the constitutional amendment at issue, was there any 
discussion of imposing criminal liability upon judges.  Indeed, there was no 
indication that the amendment was intended to apply specifically to rules of 
ethics.  The state constitution, as amended, spoke broadly of making judges 
“subject to such rules of conduct as may be promulgated by the chief 
administrator of the courts with the approval of the court of appeals.”
 
292  
Such rules are not limited to the code of judicial ethics, but also include the 
uniform rules for administration of the trial courts,293 which cover such 
matters as assignment of cases, calendar management, discovery, trial and 
motion practice and court fees.294  One doubts that any prosecutor would 
seriously suggest that a judge who grants post-note-of-issue civil discovery 
without good cause thereby commits the crime of official misconduct.295
 
289 See Garson III, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 616, *54 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 
290 See Nelson, supra note 95, at 34-36. 
291 See Abraham Abramovsky, Official Misconduct, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 22, 1999, at 3. 
292 See N.Y. Const. art. VI, ‘ 20(4). 
293 See, e.g., 22 NYCRR parts 200 (providing rules for uniform operation of trial courts in 
criminal cases), 202 (setting forth rules for Supreme Court civil operations), 208 (detailing 
rules of the New York City Civil Court). 
294 The term “conduct,” broadly interpreted, could be construed to include all these 
activities. 
295 No doubt, if this suggestion had been made during the litigation of the Garson appeal, 
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Moreover, as stated by the New York Office of Court Administration in 
its history of the judicial system, this amendment was part of a overall 
constitutional amendment aimed at centralizing of the New York State 
Unified Court System.296  Although the Unified Court System was first 
created in 1962,297 the fiscal crisis of the 1970s was a catalyst for 
substantial administrative reforms.  In 1974, a statewide administrator was 
appointed for the first time to supervise all judicial assignments in New 
York.298  In 1976, all judges, even in local courts, were made State 
employees.299  This was followed up the next year by the constitutional 
amendment package, which “created a fully centralized system of court 
management under the direction of the Chief Judge and through daily 
control of the Chief Administrator/Chief Administrative Judge B 
essentially, a formal constitutional acknowledgment of the 1974 
arrangement.”300
Therefore, the overriding rationale of the 1977 amendment was the 
centralization of New York court administration in Albany.  Instead of a 
patchwork of local courts each operating according to their own rules, New 
York adopted a system under which uniform rules and a single 
management system would operate throughout the state.  As part of this 
reform, the Legislature created a new constitutional office - that of chief 
administrator of the courts - and empowered the holder of that office to 
make rules.  Although one of the rules promulgated pursuant to this 
amendment was a code of ethics, the Senate and Assembly debates 
surrounding the amendment show that it was clearly directed at reforming 
 
 
the District Attorney’s office would respond that the crimes of official misconduct and 
receiving reward for official misconduct require proof of a “benefit” as well as a violation of 
a public servant’s duty.  See Response to Omnibus Motion, supra note 34 (arguing that the 
benefit element provides a sufficient restraint on prosecutorial discretion).  However, as 
noted above, the term “benefit” is broadly defined in the Penal Law to include “any gain or 
advantage to the beneficiary and. . . any gain or advantage to a third person pursuant to the 
desire of a beneficiary.”  See PL ‘ 10.00(17) (emphasis added).  More specifically, if a judge 
is prosecuted for violating the rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts by granting 
post-note-of-issue discovery without sufficient cause, the “benefit” element would be 
satisfied because the party obtaining the discovery would receive a “gain or advantage” with 
the judge’s desire and consent. 
296  See Office of Court Administration, History of the New York State Court System, 
available on the Internet,  
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/community_outreach/history/history_courts.html (last visited 
April 7, 2005). 
297 See id. 
298 See id. 
299 See id. 
300 See id. 
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court administration, with judicial ethics being an afterthought at most.301
The code of ethics itself - the third and final link in the Garson 
prosecutors’ chain - was likewise promulgated without any indication that 
violators would be held criminally liable.  Indeed, the preamble to the code, 
which was modeled on the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
  
Moreover, there was no indication that anyone involved in the 
constitutional drafting process envisioned imposing criminal liability for 
violation of the Chief Administrator’s rules, whether ethical or otherwise. 
302 
explicitly states that it is intended solely as a basis for judicial discipline 
and not for civil or criminal liability.303  Thus, even if the combination of 
the official misconduct statute and the 1977 amendment somehow 
delegated the power to define criminal offenses to the Chief Administrator 
- which, under La Carrubba, they could not - the Administrator clearly did 
not regard himself as acting pursuant to such a delegation.304  Under these 
circumstances, no reasonable judge could be on notice that he might face 
criminal liability for violating the New York code of judicial ethics.305
It is thus clear that implied criminal liability for judicial ethical 
violations, through the duct of the official misconduct statute, fails to 
address either the constitutional vagueness test or the practical 
considerations of judicial independence and separation of powers.  
Moreover, the compromise suggested by the Wisconsin Court of Appeal in 
Jensen and Chvala - i.e., that judges may be prosecuted only for ethical 
violations that are not integral to the process of judging
 
306
 
301 For instance, the primary subject of the Senate debate was a concomitant proposal to 
abolish elections to the Court of Appeals and replace them with a merit appointment system.  
See 1977 Senate Journal at 5528-76.  To the extent that the other aspects of the amendment 
were discussed at all, they were portrayed as an “interlinked court reform package,” in 
reference to administrative  streamlining rather than discipline.  See id. at 5563 (statement of 
Sen. Manfred Ohrenstein).  The debate in the Assembly similarly centered on merit 
appointment of Court of Appeals judges.  See 1977 Assembly Journal at 8941-58. 
 - is 
constitutionally untenable.  There is no readily apparent distinction 
between ethical rules that are integral to the judging process and those that 
are not.  For instance, one of the ethical violations of which Justice Garson 
is accused - conducting improper ex parte communications - could be 
considered integral to the judicial process because it involves the resolution 
of pending cases, or it could be considered non-integral because it takes 
place outside normal courtroom channels.  Ex parte discussions may, in 
302 See note 140 supra and accompanying text. 
303 See 22 NYCRR Part 100, Preamble. 
304 See Garson III, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 616, *53-54 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
305 See id. at *54; see also Garson I, 4 Misc. 3d at 272. 
306 See notes 205-07 supra and accompanying text. 
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fact, be integral under some circumstances - as when a judge confers 
individually with the counsel for each party during a settlement conference 
- but not others.  Far from resolving the issue of when judges could be 
lawfully prosecuted for ethical lapses, a Chvala/Jensen compromise would 
only descend more hopelessly into unconstitutional vagueness. 
If the New York State Legislature, or the legislature of any other state, 
wants to criminalize the violation of judicial ethical codes, the solution is 
simple: all that is necessary is to enact a penal statute that explicitly makes 
some or all such violations a criminal offense.  The Legislature could have 
done so at any time, and its failure to take such a step - particularly after the 
clear notice given by the Court of Appeals’ decision in La Carrubba - 
indicates that it considered the existing judicial disciplinary arrangements 
suitable.  In the absence of any legislative judgment that the disciplinary 
tribunals established under the New York State constitution provide 
inadequate deterrence, the judgment in the La Carrubba case remains 
sound, and the Garson majority’s  decision to depart from that principle is 
an unwarranted and dangerous error. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
The Garson prosecution represents the second occasion in New York on 
which a District Attorney’s office has attempted to prosecute a judge for 
violating an ethical stricture that is not explicitly contained in a penal 
statute.  As with the La Carrubba case a quarter-century before, the 
indictment of Justice Garson represents a clear instance of prosecutorial 
overreaching, and one that should not have been countenanced by the Court 
of Appeals majority. 
Judicial codes of ethics are intended to preserve the integrity and 
efficient administration of the court system rather than to serve as a basis 
for criminal liability and, as such, contain broadly worded aspirational 
standards rather than explicit prohibitions.  As such, they are too vague to 
meet the constitutional requirement that accused judges be given fair notice 
of the acts for which they might be held criminally liable.  The creation of a 
system under which prosecutors essentially act as judicial disciplinary 
authorities also infringes upon the principles of judicial independence and 
separation of powers. 
Moreover, the experience of New York and other states indicates that 
allowing judges to be prosecuted for violating such open-ended ethical 
rules invites vindictive prosecutions against judges who are perceived as 
pro-defense or are otherwise disfavored.  The ordeals of Wiley Clayton, 
Lorin Duckman, Bruce Wright and other judges who have incurred the 
wrath of local prosecutors shows that broadly worded ethical codes are 
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vulnerable to misuse for politically opportune reasons.  The potential for 
such prosecutions to chill judicial independence far outweighs any societal 
interest in stricter enforcement of judicial ethics. Judges should be 
prosecuted when they have violated a specific penal statute, but on no other 
occasion. 
 
